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TORTS IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN 
CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE ROLE OF THE FORUMt 
S. I. Shuman* and S. Prevezer** 
I. INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 
''PRIVATE international law owes its existence to the fact 
that there are in the world a number of separate territorial 
systems of law that differ greatly from each other in the rules by 
which they regulate the various legal relations arising in daily 
life."1 Where the systems are those of member states2 of a federal 
union, there should be less difference in their laws than where 
they are those of sovereign nations divided by strong cultural, 
social and political barriers. Interstate conflicts and international 
conflicts are likely to give rise to somewhat different considera-
tions and rules, and it is surely significant that the relevant branch 
of law is generally known in the United States as the conflict of 
laws and in England more usually as private international law. 
It is, therefore, worth summarizing at the outset the different 
function which the conflict of laws or private international law 
performs in the two countries, since this may help to explain 
why, in the area of torts specifically, their rules appear to be so 
different. Whether the difference in effect is as great as the dif-
ference in appearance would lead one to believe is, however, 
somewhat questionable. 
In the United States, even in the states adjacent to Mexico 
or Canada and in states which are centers of great commercial 
activity, the vast majority of civil cases which are heard by the 
tin the preparation of this paper the writers were privileged to be able to discuss 
the material with Professor Paul A. Freund of the Harvard Law School. However, the 
joint authors are alone responsible for the views presented. 
•Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A grant from the Rockefeller Foundation 
enabled Mr. Shuman to spend the 1956-57 year at the Harvard Law School.-Ed. 
••Lecturer in English Law, University College, London. A fellowship from the 
Harvard Law School enabled Mr. Prevezer to spend the 1956-57 year at the Harvard 
Law School.-Ed. 
1 Cm:.sHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4th ed., 3 (1952). 
2 Although it would be advantageous to use the word "state" primarily to refer to 
a political unit which is one of a federation of states, and the word "nation" to refer 
to a political unit which is itself not part of a federation, it becomes awkward to do so 
consistently in the discussions of conflict of laws cases. It is therefore hoped that the 
context will make clear which sense is intended, since the word "state" may sometimes 
be used in one sense and sometimes in the other. 
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courts, involving a conflict of laws, are concerned with the in-
terests of sister states of the Union. It seems likely that even with-
out the unifying provisions of the Constitution, the demand for 
comity between sister states would have produced a degree of rec-
ognition not greatly dissimilar to that obtaining today. In actual 
practice, there is relatively little constitutional compulsion af-
fecting the choice of law rules adopted by state courts8 and yet, 
having regard to the quantity and diversity of the problems pre-
sented, there nevertheless exists considerable accord on basic 
issues. 
In England, on the other hand, the conflict of laws has a far 
lesser practical importance and performs a somewhat different 
function. There the main concern is to regulate the rights of 
parties whose conduct is affected by the laws of other nations. 
The policies underlying those laws may sometimes bear little 
relation to those which would govern ·similar conduct and results 
had they occurred ~olely in England, and the need to provide 
recognition of the laws of other jurisdictions is hardly as pressing 
as in the United States. Particularly with regard to civil wrongs 
in which local penal policies are of decisive importance, such 
recognition may be even undesirable. On the other hand, the very 
fact that the issue may often have international as opposed to 
interstate repercussions suggests the need for some restriction 
upon the freedom of the forum to apply its own law. Where 
American courts are confronted with the type of problem which 
has international complexities, as in the recent case involving the 
British Nylon Spinners,4 they too may have to act with greater 
restraint in the application of the domestic law. The scarcity of 
tort cases in the English conflict of laws is clearly not so much 
attributable to the apparently inhospitable attitude of the Eng-
lish courts as to the lack of mobility of persons and chattels be-
tween England and other nations which is in marked contrast to 
the degree of such mobility between states of the Union. Com-
bined with a rigorous doctrine of precedent and a relatively un-
imaginative and conservative judiciary, this scarcity of cases has 
s Although one may wonder whether it would today take the same attitude, the 
Supreme Court went so far as to say in Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 at 176 (1916): 
"The most that the plaintiff in error can say is that the state court made a mistaken 
application of doctrines of the conflict of laws .... But that, being purely a question 
of local common law, is a matter with which this court is not concerned." 
4 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (S.D. N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 
504. 
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resulted in a failure to develop adequate conflict of laws rules to 
meet the changing and diverse demands of contemporary con-
ditions. The appropriate rule for tort cases was stated nearly a 
century ago as a result of two tort situations which came before 
the courts. These two cases were primarily concerned with the 
general maritime law as applied to British shipping and with the 
government of a British colony, as to both of which English rules 
were therefore particularly relevant.5 Unfortunately these same 
rules continue to be mechanically applied to situations entailing 
substantially different considerations. With London in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century the commercial capital of the 
world and the source of legal direction for many parts of the 
globe, the national conceit of Victorian judges was at least under-
standable and, in these two cases, perhaps somewhat justifiable. 
It is, however, instructive to note in passing that the rule of Eng-
lish municipal law6 which was applied in the first case was later 
changed7 to conform to that of the Belgian law which the Eng-
lish court had rejected. 
The situation becomes somewhat paradoxical when it is ap-
preciated that the English rules are today generally applied in 
Canada where most of the cases involve a conflict between the 
laws of the provinces. Despite the strong influence of the Privy 
Council, which was directly exerted until very recently, it seems 
particularly strange that Canadian courts have not been more 
affected by some of the more recent developments on the other 
side of the 49th parallel. Professor Hancock has stated, 
"It seems incredible that because in 1868 the Privy 
Council refused to enforce a particular rule of Belgian law, 
the courts of Canadian provinces should refuse to enforce 
any law of a sister province which happens to differ slightly 
from their own. Yet this appears to be the prevailing doc-
trine in Canada today. One would look far to find a more 
striking example of 'mechanical jurisprudence,' blind ad-
herence to a verbal formula without any regard for policies 
or consequences."8 
In English and American law, the term "tort" is used to 
designate any one of a number of widely different situations 
5 "The Halley,'' L.R. 2 P.C. 193 (1868); Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q.B. l (1870). 
6 Merchants Shipping Act, 17-18 Viet., c. 104 (1854). 
7 Pilotage Act, 2-3 Geo. 5, c. 31 (1913). 
8 HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFLicr OF LAws 89 (1942). 
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which may result in a claim for unliquidated damages by an in-
jured party. In other legal systems, the characterization or class-
ification or qualification of the same act may be different and en-
tail other consequences. 
"The same obligations which arise from torts in English 
law will be generally classified as arising from delicts, or 
quasi-delicts in French law. In the German language and 
in Slav languages they will be termed delictual or quasi-
delictual obligations, and more often obligations arising 
from 'non-permitted acts.' Many obligations which in Eng-
land are considered as arising from torts will be treated in 
the law of Continental Europe as arising from contracts.''9 
In England and in the United States, at least, characterization 
of the "threshold problem," due largely to the same common law 
heritage, is fundamentally similar. Too often, however, character-
ization as a tort is such a mechanical process that the connection 
of the act with other branches of law is practically ignored, and 
avenues of escape from an unwelcome rule or an unjust conclu-
sion are unwittingly barred. It should be remembered in this con• 
nection that "pragmatic common sense, together with a study of 
the operative features of the foreign transaction or legal institu-
tion, will go far to produce sensible results," and that "the prob-
lem of characterization may yield more serviceably to criteria of 
purpose than to analysis in the conventional terms of primary 
and secondary characterization. "10 In the area under discussion, 
this approach is particularly relevant, not merely to characteriza-
tion of the act but also to questions of substance and procedure 
and measure and remoteness of damages. These will be dealt 
with more fully later in this article. 
Once, however, as in English and American law, various acts 
are classified alike as torts merely because they are liable to result, 
in the forum at least, in similar legal consequences, the generic 
term by which they are named serves to conceal their diverse 
features and the possible variety of underlying policies, only some 
of which may be relevant to any particular cause of action. Thus 
9 Kuratowski, "Torts in Private International Law," 1 INT. L.Q. 172 (1947). 
10 Freund, "Characterization with Respect to Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," in 
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (Summer Institute on International and 
Comparative Law) 158, 164 and 159 (1949). Illustrative of the non-mechanical disposition 
of a conflict of laws case in which characterization proved to be a decisive factor is Levy 
v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928). This case is 
discussed below at note 92. 
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acts which may be intentional or negligent or may result in injury 
to substance, feelings or reputation, to persons or to property, or 
in no injury at all, or indeed even in a profit to the innocent 
party, or may involve considerable or negligible degrees of moral 
culpability or be of little or great public concern, may all give 
rise to an action in tort and yet entail vastly different policy con-
siderations. Where the acts occur in a context containing no 
foreign elements, it may not be easy to decide in a given case the 
determinative policy or at least the weight it should be accorded. 
The problem becomes immeasurably more difficult where the 
acts occur in a conflict of laws situation involving in varying de-
grees the interests of two or more jurisdictions, and it should 
therefore be apparent that a rigid rule mechanically applied to 
all torts must be inappropriate as a means of according recog-
nition to the true interests of the parties and states involved. It 
should also be clear that the different facets of a single act may 
require separate consideration and the application of different 
rules adopted from, or perhaps analogous to, those of different 
jurisdictions; in principle, this need is already, though inade-
quately, recognized by all courts in their characterization of sub-
stance and procedure. That this may be crucial to the actual 
outcome of the case is all too obvious: thus assuming, for exam-
ple, that actionability is admitted by all the systems of law con-
cerned, a plaintiff may be virtually remediless if the damages 
rule of one of those systems is mechanically applied without 
proper investigation of the policies involved and of the just solu-
tion to be reached. 
IL THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN "RULES" 
Before considering the policy factors which may be relevant 
to a tort situation involving a conflict of laws, it is worth sum-
marizing at this point the principal choice of law rules which 
are applied by English and American courts and the theoretical 
basis, if any, on which those courts purport to rely. 
The general rule in the United States is fairly accurately 
stated in section 384 of the Restatement which provides: "(l) 
If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a 
cause of action will be recognized in other states. (2) If no cause 
of action is created at the place of ·wrong, no recovery in tort can 
be had in any other state."11 These conditions will hereafter be 
11 CoNFLicr OF LAWS REsTATEMENT §384 (1934). 
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referred to as the recognition rule and the American justifiability 
rule, respectively. They are, of course, subject to at least two im-
portant qualifications, namely, that the forum adopts its own 
procedure and may refuse to entertain a cause of action which is 
contrary to its own public policy. Public policy may be reflected 
in more than one way: thus, a court may deny access on grounds 
of forum non conveniens even though, had the conduct and re-
sults occurred in the forum, it would have been actionable there. 
On the other hand, a court may grant recognition to foreign in-
terests despite the fact that the public policy of the forum would 
prevent the creation of such interests in the forum. With regard 
to substance and procedure, there is a significant tendency, at 
least partly due to the influence of the obligatio theory,12 to mini-
mize characterization as procedure by the forum. This approach 
has met with very general approval and has been strongly en-
dorsed by Cook, perhaps the leading opponent of traditional 
American theory: 
"If we admit that the 'substantive' shades off by imper-
ceptible degrees into the 'procedural,' and that the 'line' 
between them does not 'exist,' to be discovered merely by 
logic and analysis, but is rather to be drawn so as best to 
carry out our purpose, we see that our problem resolves it-
self substantially into this: How far can the court of the 
forum go in applying the rules taken from the foreign system 
of law without unduly hindering or inconveniencing it-
self?"13 
One of the basic problems, constantly confronting the Ameri-
can courts, is: Where is a tort committed? This is probably a 
matter for the lex f ori and is usually answered by following the 
lead of the Restatement rule that "the place of wrong is in the 
state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for 
an alleged tort takes place, "14 although this may sometimes entail 
applying the law of a jurisdiction which has comparatively little 
connection with the "tort" and whose interest is negligible when 
compared with that of other jurisdictions. There may easily be 
cases where the acts occur in one state and the in jury is suffered 
in another, or where both the acts and the injury occur in the 
same state but the issue in question relates more closely to a 
12 See Part III infra. 
13 COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 166 (1949). 
l4 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT §377 (1934). 
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different state. There has, therefore, been some extremely hostile 
criticism as to the applicability of the Restatement rule in such 
situations. In view of the tendency, already referred to, to ascribe 
increasing importance almost automatically to the lex loci delicti 
commissi, the unquestioning application of the rule is particularly 
meaningful and dangerous. It should, however, be noted at this 
stage that some inroads have been made on the principle of ap-
plying the law of the place of wrong, particularly in cases involv-
ing workmen's compensation, defamation and invasion of privacy, 
administration of estates and inter-family actions.15 These at least 
reveal the growing awareness of a belief, which is of central im-
portance in this paper, that mechanical jurisprudence is partic-
ularly unsuited to the conflict of laws. 
The English rules governing torts in the conflict of laws ap-
pear to reflect the difference between interstate and international 
considerations. Although the Privy Council was already con-
cerned with such problems in 1673,16 it was largely due to the 
influence of Lord Mansfield a century later that English courts 
became accustomed to entertaining tort suits involving a conflict 
of laws, although an exception, which still substantially exists 
today, was made in respect of questions involving foreign land.17 
Nevertheless, the true foundation of the modern rules is to be 
found in three cases in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
In the first of these, "The Halley,"18 decided by the Privy Council 
in 1868, the defendant owners of a British steamship were sued 
in Admiralty for damages to a Norwegian vessel in the Flushing 
Roads (Belgian waters) allegedly caused by the sole negligence 
of the compulsory pilot required by Belgian law. By the then 
English law, as stat~d in the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854,19 
the owners were exempted from liability for such negligence, al-
though by Belgian law the owners could have been held liable. 
It was held that the English court was not bound to apply Belgian 
law since it was "alike contrary to principle and to authority to 
hold, that an English Court of Justice will enforce a Foreign 
Municipal law, and will give a remedy in the shape of damages 
in respect of an act which, according to its own principles, im-
15 See Part VII infra. 
16 Blad's Case, 3 Swans. App. 603, 36 Eng. Rep. 991 (1673). 
17 British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mocambique, [1893] A.C. 602; The 
Tolten, [1946] P. 135. 
18 L.R. 2 P.C. 193 (1868). 
19 17-18 Viet., c. 104 (1854). 
1074 MICHIGAN' LAw R.Evmw [ Vol. 56 
poses no liability on the person from whom the damages · are 
claimed."20 This opinion was cited and relied upon in Phillips v. 
Eyre21 two years later in the Exchequer Chamber when the court 
was required to consider whether an action for false imprison-
ment would lie against the defendant who had detained the plain-
tiff in Jamaica. Following the detention it had been "enacted 
by the governor, legislative council and assembly of the island, 
amongst other things, that the defendant . . . was thereby in-
demnified in respect of all acts . . . done in order to put an end 
to the rebellion, and all such acts were 'thereby made and de-
clared lawful, and were confirmed.' "22 That the defendant him-
self was the governor is not without interest. Unfortunately, as 
subsequent developments have shown, the decision of Willes, 
J., was not entirely a happy one. Two conditions, hereafter re-
ferred to as the actionability rule and the English justifiability 
rule, respectively, were laid down: citing "The Halley," the 
court required, "First, the wrong must be of such a character that 
it would have been actionable if committed in England. . . . 
Secondly, the act must not have been justifiable by the law of the 
place where it was done.''23 In the light of the second condition, 
the defendant prevailed. 
The third in this trio of English cases came in 1897 with 
what has since become the most controversial decision in this 
area, Machado v. Fontes.24 The plaintiff sought damages for an 
alleged libel contained in a pamphlet published by the defend-
ant in Brazil. The amended defense, with which the decision was 
concerned, was that "by the Brazilian law the publication of the 
said pamphlet in Brazil cannot be the ground of legal proceed-
ings against the defendant in Brazil in which damages can be re-
covered ... .'' Brazilian law would, however, have made him crim-
inally liable. In deciding for the plaintiff, Lopes, L.J., said, " ... 
in order to maintain an action here on the ground of a tort com-
mitted outside the jurisdiction, the act complained of must be 
wrongful-I use the word 'wrongful' deliberately-both by the 
law of this country, and also by the law of the country where it 
was committed. . . . In the present case there can be no doubt 
that the action lies, for it complies with both of the requirements 
20 L.R. 2 P.C. 193 at 204 (1868). 
21 L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (1870). 
22 Id. at 14. 
23 Id. at 28-29. 
24 [1897] 2 Q.B. 231. 
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which are laid down by Willes J."25 In reaching the same conclu-
sion, Rigby, L.J., said, "The innocency of the act in the foreign 
country is an answer to the action. That is what is meant when 
it is said that the act must be 'justifiable' by the law of the place 
where it was done. It is not really a matter of any importance 
what the nature of the remedy for a ·wrong in a foreign country 
may be."26 
These three decisions, and . those to which they have given 
rise, particularly in Canada, have provoked considerable criti-
cism, some of which in the present writers' opinion has been far 
too extravagant, and the English rules have generally been com-
pared unfavorably to the American rules as presented in the 
Restatement. The contrast, however, is far less acute, at least in 
one important respect, than it is generally thought to be. 
It is true that the American recognition rule does not appar-
ently require, as does the English actionability rule, that the de-
fendant's conduct be such as would by the internal law of the 
forum give rise to a cause of action. However, Holmes himself 
recognized the possibility, sometime after the recognition and ac-
tionability rules had become crystallized in decisions, that "when 
it becomes material to scrutinize the question more closely, the 
English law will be found to be consistent with our views."27 
Quaere, in fact, whether ·the recognition rule, as actually applied 
in the cases, does not perform a substantially similar function to 
that performed by the actionability rule, when regard is had to 
the vital condition, which is always read into the former, permit-
ting denial of a foreign cause of action which is contrary to the 
public policy of the forum. Indeed, how many cases are there, 
particularly since the adoption of wrongful death statutes in all 
the states of the Union, in which an American forum in fact gave 
effect to a foreign "tort" when the conduct which gave rise to that 
"tort" would not have been actionable in some way by the internal 
law of the forum?28 This is to be distinguished from cases where 
25 Id. at 233-234. 
26 Id. at 235. 
27 Walsh v. New York and New England R. Co., 160 Mass. 571 at 572, 36 N.E. 
584 (1894). 
28 The area of liability without fault may present an exceptional problem because 
of the strong policy which necessarily underlies making a person who is free of fault 
liable for unliquidated damages. Thus in Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 
766 (1936), the West Virginia court was seemingly prepared to apply the strict liability 
law of Ohio where blasting in West Virginia caused damage in Ohio, without apparently 
considering whether West Virginian internal law would permit an action without proof 
of negligence. 
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the internal law of the forum differed from the foreign law as to 
the availability or nature of the remedy, as in questions of family 
disabilities, rules of limitation and damages. Where the nature 
of the remedy at the forum differs from that at the place of wrong-
doing only because the forum does not give a right to unliqui-
dated damages but makes the conduct criminal or provides a 
right to workmen's compensation, the similarity of the American 
to the English rule is still a great deal closer than is generally 
thought to be the case. However, it is even difficult to find cases 
where an American forum allows an action on a foreign tort 
where the conduct would not be actionable in tort at the forum. 
It may be thought, not without some justification, that where 
there is, for example, an interspousal disability recognized by the 
lex fori but not by the lex loci delicti commissi, then at least 
according to the law of the forum, not only may the foreign tort 
not be actionable but the act committed abroad may not be re-
garded as a tort. Usually, however, the court either treats ques-
tions of interspousal disability as substantive and does not apply 
the lex f ori as such, or 3:t least recognizes that there is a tort but 
holds that it is not actionable at the forum, stating that the lex 
fori "recognizes the wrong but denies remedy for such wrong 
by attaching to the person of the spouse a disability to sue."29 
This, perhaps, would even be the case in England.80 In such 
cases of interspousal disability of the pragmatic functioning of the 
substance-procedure distinctions is readily discernible. Instead 
of dismissing the injured spouse's action with prejudice, which 
would be judicial action hostile to the lex loci delicti _commissi, 
the forum's refusal to grant relief because of local procedure 
preserves intact the policy of the lex fori, yet may_permit the in-
jured spouse to recover elsewhere. 
In s9me early American cases, the requirement of action-
ability by the lex fori was openly conceded in effect by a condi-
tion that the foreign law had to be substantially similar to the 
law at the forum. "And some few American courts have refused 
relief where the local law, or the right given by the local law, was 
substantially different from the foreign law, or the right given by 
the foreign law."31 Even today, ho1vever firmly most of the Ameri-
29 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466 at 473, 3 N.E. (2d) 597 (1936). 
30See text infra, at notes 140 and 141, and see Broom v. Morgan, [1953] l All E.R. 
849. 
31 STUIIIBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2d ed., 182 (1951). 
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can cases deny that such similarity is required for the conduct to 
be actionable at the forum, nevertheless in regard to the wrong-
fulness or tortiousness of the conduct, public policy now appears 
to perform much the same function as the old similarity rule. 
Cases like Loucks v. Standard Oil,32 which strongly indicate the 
tendency of American courts to limit the role of public policy in 
barring actions based on "rights created" by sister states, are 
likely to be concerned not with actionability as such but rather 
with the nature or availability of the remedy. Indeed, Slater v. 
Mexican National Railroad Co.,33 which in any event was not 
concerned with sister states of the Union and was exceptional in 
that the unavailability of the remedy required by the substantive 
law of the "tort" decisively affected the question of actionability, 
really supports this proposition. It should not, however, be as-
sumed that this means that merely because the conduct would be 
actionable by the internal law of the forum, it will, therefore, 
be remediable at the forum by its conflict of laws rules. These 
rules may include a provision as to forum non conveniens and, 
as is more usual, require actionability by the lex loci delicti com-
missi. That the similarity between the English actionability rule 
and the American recognition ( cum public policy) rule is gener-
ally overlooked is not surprising in view of the fact that the vast 
majority of American cases involve interstate contacts, and that 
as among sister states of the Union there is a high degree of 
policy uniformity in characterizing the same conduct as tortious. 
Not merely does this similarity exist between the effect of the 
English and American rules, but some parallel can be drawn be-
tween the two justifiability requirements. The thrust of the 
American rule is that any defense against actionability accorded 
by the lex loci delicti commissi will be effective to prevent an 
action at the forum. Certainly the English requirement, at least 
as intended in Phillips v. Eyre, was designed to achieve the same 
result. As altered by Machado v. Fontes, however, the English 
rule appears to go further in allowing an action for unliquidated 
damages at the forum where such may not have been allowed by 
the law of the place where the 1vrong took place and had effect. 
Whether this is necessarily as unfortunate as is often claimed is 
questionable and will require careful consideration in examining 
the policy factors which may be relevant to torts involving a con-
32 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). 
33 194 U.S. 120 (1904). 
1078 · MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
flict of laws. In any event, is it entirely certain that an American 
court would, or should necessarily, today reach a different con-
clusion if confronted with the facts of J.vlachado v. Fontes? Indeed, 
it is in the area of defamation, because of the high incidence of 
interstate publication, that American courts have been virtually 
compelled, particularly in recent years, to re-examine the tradi-
tional rules relating to foreign torts. Because of this attempt to 
find less mechanical rules for defamation cases involving foreign 
interests and to adopt a more profound policy-weighing approach, 
is it so inevitable that an American court would reject the policies 
which could have justified the conclusion in Machado v. Fontes? 
III.. THEORIES FOR DECISION IN CASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
What are the theories, if any, on which these rules are said to 
be based? The classical and most often cited in the American 
courts is that the forum recognizes and gives legal effect to an ob-
ligation created by another state. Relying on the admittedly 
formidable authority of Holmes, Beale, and Cardozo, American 
judges are likely, if they recognize any theoretical basis for their 
decisions, to repeat Holmes' statement that "the theory of the . . . 
suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no law 
having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an 
obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and 
may be enforced wherever the person may be found .... But as 
the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, 
it follows that that law determines not merely the existence of 
the obligation ... but equally determines its extent."34 More 
briefly, in Cardozo's words, "the plaintiff owns something, and we 
help him to get it."35 · 
There has, however, been particularly strong criticism of the 
obligatio theory, notably by Judge Learned Hand and by such 
eminent writers as Cook, Lorenzen, and Falconbridge, on the 
grounds that, whatever the court may say, it is in fact the law 
created by the forum which disposes of the case.36 Whether or not 
34 Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 at 126 (1904). 
35 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99 at IIO, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). 
36 "But, if the organ of a State, bound by the law of this State, applies the norm 
of a foreign law to a certain case, the norm applied by the organ becomes a norm of 
the legal order of the State whose organ applies it. • • . The rule obliging the courts 
of a State to apply norms of a foreign law to certain cases has the effect of incorporating 
the norms of the foreign law into the law of this State. • • . Strictly speaking, the organ 
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it creates a right modelled on the right created by foreign law, as 
is the view of Learned Hand, or whether it merely looks to the 
rules of decision of a foreign court and then enforces a right as 
created by the forum, as was the view of Cook, these local law 
theories constitute. an interesting and suggestive departure from 
the traditional American approach.37 In particular, they avoid 
the embarrassment, which a rigorous and consistent application 
of the obligatio theory should entail, of enforcing in all cases a 
right created by the whole law of the relevant foreign state, in-
cluding its rules of conflict of laws and of procedure and perhaps 
of the forum submerging even its own rules of public policy. 
Moreover, where the wrongful act occurs in one state and the in-
jury is sustained in another, then the local law theory, at least as 
expounded by Cook, creates "no impediment to its [the forum] 
turning to two or even more states if two or more questions are in-
volved."38 Indeed, its flexibility,39 particularly under Cook's view, 
may permit a forum to consider the laws of two or more states 
even where only one question is to be decided-thus, where the is-
sue is that of compensation for loss of a limb, the forum would be 
free to consider the damages rule of the place of negligent act, or 
of the domicile of the parties, as well as that of the place of impact. 
Since a completely consistent application of the obligatio theory 
would seem to demand that the forum does not apply its own 
procedure, at least where the foreign law characterizes the par-
ticular issue as substantive, it may prevent the forum applying its 
own damages formula in a suit brought in the forum by one of its 
domiciliaries against another of its domiciliaries for injuries sus-
tained in a neighboring state, even though perhaps the wrong-
ful acts which caused the harm occurred in the forum. To be sure, 
even the Restatement, of which Beale was the official reporter, ac-
of a State can apply only norms of the legal order of its own State." KEr.sEN, GENERAL 
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 244 (1945). 
87 See further Cavers, Comment: "The Two 'Local Law' Theories," 63 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
822 (1950). 
88 Id. at 830. 
89 That the local law theory may not be so flexible is indicated by Yntema: " ... this 
theory suffers not merely from the common formalism of all positivistic explanations 
of law and their nationalistic emphasis, but does so in a subject matter where local 
doctrines ·have to be reconciled with international needs-needs the satisfaction of which 
requires at the very least comparative study of the policies employed under the relevant 
national laws in dealing with specific cases. In short, except as supplemented by reference 
to such considerations, it is with deference submitted, the 'local law' theory is in relation 
to this subject matter an inadequate species of mechanical•jurisprudence." Yntema, Book 
Review, 27 CAN. B. R.Ev. 116 at 117 (1949). 
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knowledged that the interests of more than one state may require 
recognition by the forum (so as to deny an action), as in cases 
where the alleged tortfeasor acted in a jurisdiction in pursuance 
of a duty or a privilege conferred on him by the law of that juris-
diction even though injury is suffered in another jurisdiction 
whose law has not recognized that duty or privilege.40 
To this extent, the Restatement shows a greater appreciation 
of the problems which may be involved than does Cheshire who, 
although rightly criticizing the English rules, nevertheless is al-
most equally mechanistic in his application of the obligatio the-
ory, as the following passage indicates: 
"Theoretically there is no doubt that the lex loci delicti 
commissi is the most appropriate law to govern the matter. 
If a plaintiff in English proceedings claims damages for a 
tort committed against him abroad, it is elementary common 
sense that the court should adopt the law of the place where 
the alleged infringement of his right occurred. Only in that 
way can the true character of his right and of the resultant 
obligation of the defendant be justly determined. It is that 
law to which the defendant owed obedience at the decisive 
moment, and it is by that law that his liability, if any, should 
be measured. "41 
Cheshire then cites the extract from Holmes already quoted, ac-
knowledges that it has been criticized, and continues: 
"Nevertheless, it seems almost self-evident that the lex loci 
delicti commissi . should be decisive and that the lex fori 
should apply only in so far as the recognition of an obligation 
as nearly equivalent as possible to that created by the foreign 
law would infringe its own doctrine of public policy or would 
conflict with its law of procedure."42 
That this statement is too sweeping will shortly be shown, it is 
hoped, in the reasons for the submission that there may be cases 
in which the forum should not only exercise a negative, restrain-
ing influence but should grant a remedy even though "the last 
act necessary to cause injury occurred abroad" and by the law of 
that place no remedy is granted. 
How relevant are these theories to the English rules? The 
40 CONFLICf OF LAWS REsTATEMENT §382 (1934). 
41 CHESHIRE, PRlVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4th ed., 256 (1952). 
42 Id. at 257. 
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only significance of the foreign law to an English forum is, at 
least on the usual interpretation of Phillips v. Eyre today, wheth-
er it justifies the defendant's action. Unfortunately, there is no 
English authority determining what is the appropriate foreign 
law where the laws of at least two foreign jurisdictions may be 
appropriate and where the forum generally feels itself compelled 
to choose between the law of the place where the wrongful act 
occurred and that of the place where the injury was sustained. 
Although Machado v. Fontes was apparently used by Hohfeld 
in his lectures at the Yale Law School as the cornerstone in his 
early formulation of a local law theory,48 the decision of Willes, 
J., in Phillips v. Eyre on which that case was purportedly based, 
contains a passage which reads today as though it might have 
been written at a somewhat later date by Holmes or Beale: 
"The obligation is the principal to which a right of action 
in whatever court is only an accessory, and such accessory, 
according to the maxim of law, follows the principal, and 
must stand or fall therewith. 'Quae accessorium locum ob-
tinent extinguuntur cum principales res peremptae sunt.' 
A right of action, whether it arise from contract governed 
by the law of the place or wrong, is equally the creature of 
the law of the place and subordinate thereto.''44 
The most convincing explanation of this parodox is, it is sub-
mitted, the one which has been offered by Yntema and approved 
by Cheshire. Although Willes, J ., stated that the conduct would 
have to be achievable in England before it could there be sued 
upon, "is it reasonable," asks Yntema, "to construe this as more 
than the statement of a threshold requirement that a suit on a 
foreign 'wrong' must be such as to be triable in England, e.g., 
not an action for trespass to foreign land ... nor one excluded on 
principles of policy found for instance in the general maritime 
law as declared by Parliament (The Halley)?"45 This, of course, 
was not the interpretation of Machado v. Fontes which, in allow-
ing an action for damages supposedly not allowed by the lex loci 
delicti commissi, clearly rejected the obligatio theory. To what-
ever extent the English courts today can be said to follow a local 
48 As FALCONBRIDGE, EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 19 (1947) points out, citing 
Lorenzen, Book Review, 52 YALE L. J. 680 (1943). 
44 L.R. 6 Q.B. I at 28 (1870). 
45 Yntema, Book Review, 27 CAN. B. REv. 116 at 119 (1949). But see, e.g., GRAVESON, 
THE CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., 428 (1955). 
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law theory, however unwittingly, it must necessarily be such a 
theory as has been propounded by Cook and not by Learned 
Hand since it is generally assumed that there is no compulsion 
for the forum to create ". . . an obligation of its own as nearly 
homologous as possible to that arising in the place where the 
tort occurs."46 
There are then at least two theories which have been in-
fluential, particularly in the United States, in determining tort 
questions in the conflict of laws. Despite the fact that American 
courts, when they do recognize an underlying theoretical basis 
for their decisions, generally express allegiance to the obligatio 
theory, nevertheless, in view of the inroads which have been 
made on it and the important qualifications which in practice 
have always been read into it, even by those same .courts 
which have professed to adopt it, the explanation of the decisions 
can more suitably be made in terms of some type of local law 
theory. In the light of this, it is submitted that the courts would 
better dispose of tort cases involving a conflict of laws, were they 
to consider carefully and openly the various policies and interests 
which merit attention, an examination of which the local law 
theory, at least as advanced by Cook, encourages if not demands. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE FORUM 
What then are some of the factors which should be considered 
in determining actionability at the forum for relief against al-
legedly wrongful conduct where the entire collocation of events 
and interests which constitutes the cause of action involves at least 
some contact with another jurisdiction? If a mechanical rule, 
and therefore an unsatisfactory rule, is to be avoided, it is im-
portant to bear in mind the fact that "tort" or "wrongful injury" 
covers a wide range of quite different acts. Where the law of a state 
which may be the forum itself, discloses an interest which is vital 
to the security or order of that state, this should obviously be a 
factor of extreme importance. Alternatively or additionally, in-
terests may be disclosed directed toward the preservation of some 
special condition of life considered essential by one of the states 
concerned. In the _hierarchical order of interests, security and 
order are more likely to merit and receive recognition than are 
such special conditions indigenous to a particular jurisdiction, 
46 Guinness v. Miller, (S.D. N.Y. 1923) 291 F. 769 at 770. 
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except perhaps where the forum has a like interest in maintaining 
the existence of such a condition. Thus if the act complained of 
was one which allegedly gave the plaintiff a right to unliquidated 
damages solely because the law of the place of utterance, in fur-
therance of that state's policy to perpetuate segregation, made 
it actionable per se to call a white man a Negro's friend, there 
may arise, even as between sister states of the Union, a public 
policy defense against enforcement of the interest "created" by 
the foreign law. But if an action were to be pursued in Missis-
sippi or Alabama on such a foreign tort, public policy would 
almost certainly play a different role from that which it might 
in an action in New York City. Although there is no Supreme 
Court decision which has so held, it is likely that the public policy 
of the forum may operate to prevent action even under the stat-
ute of a sister state and this despite a strong reading of Hugh es 
v. Fetter.41 In suggesting that there may be a difference were the 
action to be brought in New York City or in Alabama, it is not 
suggested that the former forum would or should necessarily 
deny recovery. If the plaintiff was injured at the place of action 
and injury, this may warrant recovery in New York City even 
though the allegedly slanderous statement would at the place of 
the forum be more praiseworthy than a true statement as to the 
plaintiff's feelings toward colored people. However, the denial 
of relief in New York might readily withstand constitutional 
attack because of the public policy exceptions to the requirements 
of full faith. 
Since a public policy defense may prevail, even as among states 
bound by an enforceable full faith and credit clause and generally 
adopting somewhat similar policies in characterizing acts as un-
lawful, it is all the more to be expected when dealing with tort ac-
tions involving jurisdictions not subject to such constitutional 
(or treaty) provisions and adopting somewhat different policies 
in matters of characterization. Thus the English rule which re-
quires that the conduct which gave rise to the tort be also action-
able in England is not entirely without justification and perhaps 
even merit where the foreign tort involves some interest as to 
which the forum itself possesses a strong conflicting interest. 
Were not something like the English actionability and the Amer-
ican public policy limitations available to courts in those jurisaic-
tions, they might be compelled to grant relief for conduct anti-
47 341 U.S. 609 (1951). 
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thetical to _the security and order of the forum. But to conclude 
from this that the public policy limitation should also operate 
where the allegedly wrongful conduct does not "violate some 
fundamental principle qf justice, some prevalent conception of 
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal"48 
is to convert the reasonable into the unjust. It is in the effort to 
avoid this result that writers have sometimes gone to the other ex-
treme in arguing that the "accident" of the forum should be im-
material. 
The range of pressures emanating from the policies involved 
in foreign tort cases and affecting substantial interests of the 
forum may be illustrated by the following cases which suggest 
that there are clearly some instances where the public policy of 
the forum should be determinative and others where it would 
be improper to allow that policy to have such effect. 
(1) D, a private citizen of California, while in State X, de-
stroys some parcels belonging to P because D knew they contained 
dope which was shortly to be smuggled into California. (2) In 
the process of committing the acts involved in (1 ), D assaults P. 
(3) In the process of committing the acts involved in (I) D kills 
P. In each instance, an action is subsequently brought in Califor-
nia. In the first case, it is suggested that the California policy 
against smuggling dope into the state may be sufficiently strong 
to outweigh the competing interest of both X and P. This may 
be so even though the interest of X lies in the generally respected 
need to prevent private individuals from taking the law into 
their own hands, while P's interest, which stems from the same 
policy, is the protection of his goods from confiscation by a pri-
vate person. Quaere, however, whether the interests of California 
are sufficiently strong to permit its policy to govern in the latter 
.two cases? If "Oklahoma" and "whiskey" were substituted for 
"California" and "dope" respectively, the cases might be rather 
more probable though perhaps somewhat less persuasive and it 
may, of course, be extremely relevant in the California-dope 
cases whether X is Communist China or Hawaii.49 
Contrasted to cases where the forum may deny relief and the 
place of action and injury may grant it are those where the re-
48 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99 at 111, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). 
49 If cases like The Helena, 4 Ch. Rob. 3, 165 Eng. Rep. 515 (1801), or Santos v. 
Illidge, 8 C.B. (n.s.) 861, 141 Eng. Rep. 1404 (1860), were to occur today, different con-
clusions might well be reached by the English courts. 
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verse occurs. These may present further complexities, since great-
er "creativeness" and a much more emphatic rejection of the 
foreign law is required if the forum grants relief for actions or 
injuries which (where they occur) are not actionable. For the 
forum to deny relief obtainable at the place of injury or action 
is, at least in theory, only an inconvenience to the plaintiff who 
may still institute proceedings elsewhere. But for the forum to 
grant relief is far more than mere theoretical inconvenience to 
the defendant. Because this is so, still more should be required 
before the public policy of the forum should allow relief for 
actions or injuries which, where they occur, would not be action-
able. The English rule for foreign torts, as at present interpreted, 
precludes relief in any case where the acts are innocent, or at 
least justifiable, by the lex loci delicti commissi. It is clear that 
this rule may operate to encourage persons to commit acts abroad 
which, while justifiable there, are by the standards of England 
and other civilized countries not justifiable even by minimal 
criteria for civilized conduct. If this is so, the English rule frus-
trates one of the very purposes of having a body of law like pri-
vate international law, though whether in practice it would 
recognize the provisions of the law of an uncivilized haven for 
tortfeasors is still to be decided. There may be cases where, despite 
Cheshire's strong admonition to the contrary, it may not be 
"most startling and ... most unjust ... if, in accordance with the 
lex fori, the defendant were held responsible for what would be 
an innocent act in the place where it was committed."50 
With regard to this kind of problem, it is worth considering 
the following cases. On some occasion shortly before World War 
II, D, an anti-semitic Englishman in Germany, sees P wearing 
the identification required at that time to be worn by Jews in 
Germany. D assaults P for no reason other than that P is too slow 
in stepping off the pavement as D passes by. The assault causes 
permanent, grievous injury. By the law of Germany the assault 
is justifiable in each of the following cases: (I) P is an English 
Jew in Germany on business; (2) P's German nationality has 
been terminated because he is a Jew and he is therefore a state-
less person at the time of the assault; (3) P is a German national. 
It is not beyond imagination that a case raising substantially like 
problems may occur in the United States, if a Negro is assaulted 
50 CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 4th ed., 256 (1952). 
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in Lefore County, Mississippi and subsequently sues his assailant 
in New York City; or again, if in 1943 a Japanese were assaulted 
in San Francisco with subsequent action in New York City. 
Although the suggested analysis of the above hypothetical 
cases may .entail the extraterritorial application of the lex fori, 
such an application is not without some support even from the 
Restatement and the cases. Both the Restatement of the Conflict 
of Laws and the proposed Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 
Second provide for situations where the forum may apply its 
own law so as to require a course of conduct in another jurisdic-
tion. 51 Indeed, the Restatement Second in section 94 deliberately 
alters the original section 94 so as to omit the requirement in 
the original Black-Letter rule that the required act "is not con-
trary to the law of the state in which it is to be performed."52 
Although for practical reasons this change may have in part 
been compelled by some recent decisions,53 the Reporter for the 
Restatement Second bases the change on a much wider ground, 
namely, that "it is believed that there is no jurisdictional limita-
tion, strictly speaking, that the defendant should not be ordered 
to do an act in a state which is contrary to that state's law."54 
The philosophy underlying the change in section 94 of the Re-
statement of the Conflict of Laws even more clearly underlies sec-
tion 9(c) of the proposed Restatement of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States which provides, "A state has jurisdiction 
to prescribe rules governing conduct occurring: ... (c) Entirely 
outside its territory if the conduct has effects within its territory 
which have a reasonably close relationship to the conduct."55 
51Sections 94, 95, 96 and 97 in both Restatements. It is interesting to note that these 
sections of the Restatements find support in the statement of the Master of the Rolls in 
British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. He there states: 
" .•• there is no doubt that it is competent for the courts of a particular country, in 
a suit between persons who are either nationals or subjects of that country or are other-
wise subject to its jurisdiction, to make orders in personam against one such party, 
directing it, for example, to do something or to refrain from doing something in another 
country affecting the other party to the action." [1952] 2 All E.R. 780 at 782. 
52 CONFLicr OF LAWS RESTATEMENT §94 (1934). 
53 See, e.g., Societe Internationale, etc. v. McGranery, (D.C. D.C. 1953) 111 F. Supp. 
435, affd. 225 F. (2d) 532 (1955), cert. den. 350 U.S. 976 (1956); United States v. Imperial 
Chemical Industries, Ltd., (S.D. N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 504; United States v. Holophone 
Co., (S.D. Ohio 1954) 119 F. Supp. 114, affd. 352 U.S. 903 (1956). Also see note, ~9 HARV. 
L. REv. 1452 (1956), and further citations therein. 
54 CoNFLicr OF LAWS RESTATEMENT, SECOND 9 (Tent. Draft No. 4) (1957). 
55 THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES RESTATEMENT §9c (Tent. 
Draft No. I) (1957). Section 9c, however, was sent ,back for further consideration by the 
Reporter and in Tent. Draft No. 2, §9c appears as §Sc and reads: "A state has jurisdiction 
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These Restatement provisions have become virtual necessities be-
cause of the antitrust and cartel cases.56 The reasoning of these 
provisions, however, is clearly not to be confined only to such sit-
uations, provided the interests of the forum are sufficiently affect-
ed to warrant application of its own internal law. This is not to 
deny that there may be very serious practical difficulties where 
there are conflicting national policies as was well illustrated by the 
British Nylon Spinners case, 57 but such difficulties constitute only 
one of many factors, all of which must be weighed. As a recent 
note discussing the American antitrust cases points out, "the rele-
vant factors appear to be (I) location of the violation, (2) relation-
ship of the defendant to the United States, (3) extent of conflict 
with foreign law, and (4) nature of the remedy sought."58 Clearly 
the list is not exhaustive and in cases other than those involving 
antitrust problems there may be an equally complex combina-
tion of relevant factors. 
A word of caution may here be in order to suggest that we 
are not attempting to defend the theory that the philosophical 
basis for private international law is some natural law theory of 
justice, except to the extent that natural law implies only that a 
jurisdiction should be free to do more than mechanistically ap-
ply conflict of laws rules where these rules were intended to apply 
only as between nations or states of comparable standards of 
civilization. The two-part English rule for foreign torts is in ap-
pearance like the full faith and credit clause of the American 
Constitution in its rigidity. Both may through their very inflex-
ibility achieve laudable results provided their proper area of 
application is also made a part of the rule. Unfortunately, the 
English rule for international torts, unlike the American full 
faith and credit clause, is not strictly limited in its operation, 
but may apply as would the full faith and credit clause, were 
its area of effectiveness extended to the "Acts, Records and Judi-
to prescribe rules attaching legal consequences to conduct, including rules relating to 
property, status or other interests with respect to conduct occurring: . . . Entirely 
outside its territory if the conduct has, or is intended to :have, effects within its territory 
which have a reasonably close relationship to the conduct." This section was again 
subjected to extensive discussion and has again been sent back for further consideration 
by the Reporter. 
56 See note 53 supra. 
57 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All 
E.R. 780. 
58 Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1452 at 1453 (1956). 
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cial Proceedings" of any sovereign nation or state. It should be 
noted, however, that there has thus far been no conclusive ruling 
by the House of Lords, either that the rules as stated for foreign 
torts are determinative in the usual case or, a fortiori, that they 
should apply to cases where the foreign standards of conduct 
deviate markedly from those which obtain in England or other 
civilized countries. What underlies the present argument as to 
the extent to which the public policy of the forum may govern 
interests created or affected by conduct which occurs elsewhere 
is not some natural law theory but something like a theory of 
maximum tolerance. This theory is not premised on any convic-
tion as to the nature of man but only on a belief that, given some-
thing like the level of civilization which obtains at the forum, 
it may properly serve as the basis for decision in certain types 
of cases. However, it should not necessarily be expected that the 
forum should defer to the laws of a jurisdiction whose standards 
fall below the minima permitted even by maximum tolerance. 
When it is urged that the forum should enjoy greater freedom 
to permit its own policy to operate, this in no way implies that 
the policies of the other possibly appropriate _jurisdictions are 
to be ignored. Were they to be ignored, as was once suggested 
by the .exponents of the extreme lex fori theory, this would be a 
reversion to the most primitive stage of private international 
law and quite opposed to the direction here considered to be 
desirable. The usual American rules for foreign torts as well as 
the English justifiability rule indicate some awareness of the im-
portance of the foreign law. Indeed, as suggested above, often 
too much importance is attributed to the foreign law, particularly 
in the United States, as a result of unimaginative and mechanical 
application of that law. Assuming that the courts should attempt 
to make use of the rules in ways which permit them to examine 
all the different factors required for a just decision and that they 
should not automatically minimize the strength of their own 
public policy, there is more need than ever to attend to the 
meaning and implications of the English justifiability rule and 
its American counterpart as applied under the obligatio theory. 
V. APPLYING THE LAW OF THE FORUM 
Few cases better reveal the issues here involved than does 
Machado v. Fontes. There the court of appeal found that the 
justifiability requirement was satisfied since according to the 
law of the place of action and injury, Brazil, the defendant's con-
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duct was criminal. Not without some logic, the court in effect 
decided that criminal conduct could hardly be considered as 
justifiable and hence if the conduct of the defendant was action-
able in England, the plaintiff should be permitted to recover 
damages. The difficulty, however, stemmed from the fact that 
Brazilian law was not shown to have provided any civil remedy 
for criminal conduct of the kind committed. Neither logic nor 
precedent afforded an adequate rationale of the actual decision, 
and in permitting the plaintiff to proceed in England, the court 
was compelled to interpret the existing rule in a somewhat crea-
tive fashion. For a plaintiff to proceed in England, the foreign 
conduct had only to be not "innocent" and the justifiability re-
quirement meant not that the conduct was actionable where 
committed but only that it was not innocent there. 
It is submitted that the result reached in Machado v. Fontes 
may have been a proper one, but that from an examination of the 
opinion this is not determinable. The result could more easily 
be supported if, for example, both parties had been Englishmen, 
or still better, domiciled in England, and the defendant had in-
tentionally libeled the plaintiff in Brazil because by that law 
libel gave rise to no action in tort. There would be further evi-
dence to support such a decision if the defendant fled Brazil so 
as to escape criminal liability. Moreover, the decision itself could 
be supported even within the policy confines of the English 
rules if, although no action for unliquidated damages were al-
lowable in Brazil, the Brazilia,n criminal court could award com-
pensation to an injured party. Rabel, in fact, states that the 
Brazilian penal code of 1890 imposed a duty of idemnification 
"as an effect of every criminal condemnation,"59 although, in-
credibily, no mention was made of this duty in Machado v. 
Fontes. That compensation can be awarded in a criminal action 
is not unheard of in England where specific legislation so permits 
for certain classes of cases. 
In thus suggesting some possible reasons for supporting a con-
clusion like that reached in Machado v. Fontes, it is not claimed 
that if in fact the only contact with England had been that the 
action was brought there, the decision of the court of appeal had 
little merit. This is particularly so since the decision may have 
been based, as suggested above, on a misreading of Phillips v. 
59 2 RABEL, THE CoNFLicr OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 241 (1945). 
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Eyre and perhaps even, as Rabel indicates, on a misinterpretation 
of the law of Brazil. Although because of the full faith require-
ments it may not be true in the United States, nevertheless where 
a plaintiff sues in England, it may be extremely questionable 
whether the choice of forum can properly be said to be entirely 
"accidental." When a plaintiff incurs the additional expense and 
possible inconvenience of suing elsewhere than at the place of in-
jury, which is generally likely also to be the place most con-
venient to his witnesses, he often does so not so much to take 
advantage of a particularly favorable law as to secure judgment 
at a place where the defendant has reachable assets. This alone 
does not generally warrant the application of the forum's public 
policy to defeat actionability or to create an action for a foreign 
tort where to do so would be contrary to the laws of the place of 
injury or action, but added to other contacts with the forum it 
may be an important element in encouraging it to apply its own 
law. Since the thrust of the law of torts is to decide whether the 
burden of loss shall be shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant, 
may not the forum have some legitimate interest in determining 
the disposition of assets situated within its jurisdiction especially 
where the plaintiff may take them elsewhere? 
In addition to the factors already mentioned which it is be-
lieved a court should consider in attempting to decide a case like 
Machado v. Fontes, all of which strengthen the reasons for ap-
plying the lex fori, regard must also be paid to the factors which 
shaped the particular foreign law or laws. Even were the parties 
English domiciliaries with assets in England and had the defend-
ant fled Brazil in order to escape criminal prosecution, the factors 
which might lead Brazilian law to deny an action for unliqui-
dated damages, if it would in fact do so, may be sufficiently strong 
to- outweigh the interests of the forum. In the field of defamation, 
factors which lead to the denial of an action for unliquidated 
damages may not be readily apparent although this need not 
always be so. In a jurisdiction which has only recently regained 
the privileges of a free press, there may be a deliberate prohibi-
tion against tort actions for libel in the hope of encouraging free 
expression of opinion by imposing only relatively moderate 
penalties for criminal libel. 
A tort case not relating to defamation may better illustrate 
what is involved in the "interests-weighing" approach here ad-
vocated. D alienates the affections of P's wife in X which is the 
matrimonial domicile. P sues for alienation in Y which, while it 
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does not by its internal law make the conduct of D actionable in 
tort, does provide for criminal liability upon proof of seduction 
of a married woman within its jurisdiction. P cannot secure serv-
ice upon D other than in Y where D is domiciled and has reach-
able assets. Although it was earlier suggested that the American 
recognition (cum public policy) rule usually operates in effect 
in a way not very different from the English actionability rule, 
the above case is conceded as a possible instance where the 
effect of public policy upon the recognition rule may, and indeed 
should, produce an effect different from that which would prob-
ably be achieved by the English actionability rule. Since the 
conduct is wrongful (not innocent) by the law of the place of 
injury and would be criminal by the law of the forum if it had 
occurred in the forum, the denial of a civil remedy for like con-
duct at the forum should not therefore require a denial of P's 
civil action in Y. Absent some very substantial interest of Y which 
touches its security or order and which is something more than 
its interest in preserving special conditions of life, Y should not 
deny P's action for alienation. To paraphrase Cardozo's words, 
the court should not be so provincial as to say that every solution 
of a problem is wrong because it deals with it otherwise at home. 
The facts and conclusion of a case not entirely dissimilar to 
that cited above are extremely interesting and illuminating, and 
indicate that at least some American judges are not blind to the 
factors and methods, which in the writers' opinion, should de-
termine tort actions involving a conflict of laws. The plaintiff in 
Gordon v. Parker60 was absent on war service in India when his 
wife became involved with the defendant. The husband and wife 
were throughout the relevant period legal domiciliaries of Penn-
sylvania which was therefore the matrimonial domicile. The 
wife's involvement and her acts of indiscretion occurred in Mas-
sachusetts where the defendant was domiciled. The plaintiff 
sued in federal court in Massachusetts for damages for alienation 
of affections. Massachusetts law, but not Pennsylvania law, recog-
nizes a tort of alienation. There was no proof of adultery between 
the wife and the defendant but, it may be noted, adultery is a 
crime in both states and gives rise to a civil cause of action in 
Pennsylvania as well in Massachusetts. The court held that the 
complaint stated a cause of action. Even if one were to disagree 
with the conclusion reach~d by Judge Wyzanski, one should at 
60 (D.C. Mass. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 40. 
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least commend the manner of reasoning which led him to that 
conclusion. After stating the defendant's argument that "where 
the asserted damage has been inflicted on a marital relationship, 
Massachusetts would recognize that the existence of liability 
should be determined by the policy not of the forum, or of the 
place of wrong, but of the state of marital domicil," he felt none-
theless that a Massachusetts court would reject these arguments 
"as applied to this case." He said: 
"This is not a situation in which the interests of Pennsyl-
vania plainly outweigh those of Massachusetts. The social 
order of each is implicated. As the place of matrimonial 
domicil, Pennsylvania has an interest in whether conduct in 
any part of the world is held to affect adversely the marriage 
relationship between its domiciliaries. But, as the place 
where the alleged misconduct occurred and as the place 
where the alleged wrongdoer lives, Massachusetts also has 
an interest. She is concerned with conduct within her bor-
ders which in her view lowers the standards of the com-
munity where they occur. She is also concerned when her 
citizens intermeddle with other people's marriages .... "61 
The Judge strengthened this conclusion by finding that "Penn-
sylvania has no general policy that injured spouses should bear 
their suffering in silence and rely exclusively upon the forces of 
social ostracism and religious discipline ... " but has "spoken 
qua possible forum and qua possible state of defendant's domicil, 
but not qua state of matrimonial domicil."62 
The decision has here been quoted somewhat extensively be-
cause it comes as a welcome departure from the mechanical ap-
plication of rigid rules and displays an acute awareness of some 
of the factors which should be carefully considered by courts in 
cases of this kind. However difficult it is or may be to locate the 
place of injury in a case where the injury is not to substance or 
to locate the jurisdiction where the last event took place which 
allegedly gave rise to liability, a less imaginative judge, perhaps 
believing himself to be all the bolder for applying the law of the 
matrimonial domicile in a case of tort, might have denied the 
action without adequate consideration of the legitimate interests 
of the states and the parties. If, in a similar case, another court 
were to reach a conclusion contrary to that reached by Judge 
611d. at 42. 
621d. at 43. 
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Wyzanski, one would not complain provided it were to weigh 
the interests and merits in the balance and by this method arrive 
at a determination of no liability. Were the facts of a borderline 
case like Gordon v. Parker to be changed slightly, if, for example, 
the defendant were domiciled in Pennsylvania, or even in a state 
whose policy more closely resembled that of Pennsylvania than 
that of Massachusetts, it would not be difficult to sustain a con-
trary conclusion, even though Massachusetts would still possess 
a substantial interest because of conduct within its borders. 
In the passages from Gordon v. Parker cited above, the court 
refers to the interest of Massachusetts in the maintenance of its 
"social order." It may be recalled that this is one of the two gen-
eral factors, the other being security, to which we have previously 
given special emphasis. It has been here urged that where either 
of these is significantly involved in a conflict of laws situation, 
there may then be stronger reasons for applying the law of that 
jurisdiction whose security or order is affected by the conduct in 
question. Where the security or order of more than one jurisdic-
tion is affected, as in Gordon v. Parker, then the interests-weigh-
ing approach, though more difficult to apply, is nonetheless prefer-
able to the admittedly simpler mechanical rules which unfortun-
ately still govern this area of law. When it is said that interests of 
another state in maintaining social order or security should be 
recognized, if not necessarily held decisive, this is not meant to 
suggest that the forum should enforce the criminal law, as such, 
of another jurisdiction. Clearly, where the conduct is only crim-
inal by both the· law of the forum and the law of the place of 
wrongdoing, the danger that the wrongdoer will escape all liabil-
ity is only properly to be met by extradition and not by granting 
a civil remedy at the forum. Where his conduct is only criminal 
by the place of wrongdoing and is tortious by neither system of 
law, then there is all the more reason for denying an action in 
damages. Rather, it is only where there is some tort element in-
volved either as a result of the lex fori (Machado v. Fontes) or as a 
result of the law of another interested jurisdiction, that the ex-
istence of interests in security or order becomes relevant for con-
flict of laws cases. While jurisdictions do not enforce the criminal 
laws of one another, a forum while giving effect to the tort laws 
of another may thus effectuate the same policy which underlies 
its own criminal law. Conversely, by applying its own tort law 
while the conduct is only criminal by the other law concerned, 
the forum may be giving effect to the same policy which under-
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lies both laws .. That this may be so is not unexpected in view of 
the ~any connections between the laws of tort and crime. As the 
court acknowledged in Gordon v. Parker, "Tort law, like its 
younger brother criminal law, was sired by a policy of regulating 
the social order and substituting legal process for self-help .... To 
be sure, tort law also always has a compensatory element. But that 
is of secondary consequence ... in the tort of alienation of affec-
tions .... " 63 Obviously, this may be equally true for other torts. 
That there is this close relationship between the two branches 
of law is best demonstrated by the fact that in a great many juris-
dictions the same conduct may give rise to both tortious and crim-
inal liability as in cases of assault, alienation, conspiracy, defama-
tion, conversion, and even negligence. Particularly in some such 
instances is it difficult for the forum to perceive the reasons for 
the foreign characterization as criminal and not tortious as well. 
But where in a given situation the policy is the same under both 
characterizations although the labels are different, then the dan-
ger of simply enforcing the penal policy of another state is dimin-
ished. The same kind of analysis may be necessary in cases where 
the combination is not one of crime and tort as for example where 
workmen's compensation is combined with tort. Here there is a 
strong state interest in security and social order although it is 
differently expressed. 
VI. SIMPLE RULES FOR COMPLEX CASES? 
One of the ways of appreciating some of the complications 
which are generally overlooked when a mechanistic approach is 
adopted for conflict of laws in cases involving a tort is to consider 
the diverse combination of factors in a relatively simple case. 
The minimum requirement for a conflict of laws situation is that 
the law of two jurisdictions is involved and the simplest issue 
which can arise is where the jurisdictions differ only as to whether 
the defendant's conduct is tortious or innocent. Even in this 
basic case there are four different possible combinations which 
are considered below. It must be emphasized at this point that 
throughout the following analyses it is assumed that the American 
courts do as those courts and most writers say they do, namely, ap-
ply public policy only restrictively, so as to suggest that tort ac-
tions are not allowed at the forum for conduct which if occurring 
63 Id. at 42, citing MAINE, ANCIENT LAw, Pollock, 12th ed., 391. 
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there would not be actionable. This, we have suggested, is to over-
state the case, but we assume it to be true in order to show that 
even if it were true, the results would too often be undesirable. 
Even if this assumption is incorrect, as we believe it to be, the 
then analogous English-American rules are still far from desirable 
as should be apparent from considering some of the English con-
clusions in the following cases. 
Hereafter, the following notational conveniences will be em-
ployed: "I" for the place of injury or impact (where the last event 
occurred); "A" for the place where the alleged, wrongful act oc-
curred; "F" for the place of the forum; "T" for tort; "C" for 
criminal; "S" for the United States; and "E" for England. In the 
basic case the situation is as follows: 
(I) 1} T) (3) I }not T) ) A ) 
)TS&TE ) not TS & not TE 
F T) F T) 
(2) 1} T) (4) I }not T) ) A ) 
) TS & not TE ) not TS & not TE 
F not T) F not T) 
"I" and "A" are connected by a bracket to indicate that they are the 
same place. 
Case (I) therefore means that by the law of the place of action 
which is also the place of injury the conduct is considered tor-
tious, as it is by the lex f ori. Where this structure occurs, the 
mechanical application of both the English and American rules 
would result in the forum allowing an action. Case (2) is the in-
teresting case, for of the four here considered, it is the only one 
where the English and American courts may differ, provided, it 
should be stressed again, public policy only operates, as dicta in 
American cases seem to suggest. 
Even in this simple situation, the results reached in two of the 
four cases by the application of rigid rules has already been criti-
cized. The English denial of an action in (2) as well as the Ameri-
can and English denial of an action in (3) may under certain cir-
cumstances not achieve the most desirable result. It should, there-
fore, be obvious that whenever the situation is complicated only 
slightly, where, for example, the conduct may be either, neither, 
or both tortious and criminal, then the application of inflexible 
rules is even more likely to produce unsatisfactory results. In 
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such cases, there are then not four but sixteen possibilities. Recog-
nizing that the result is generally the same by the traditional 
rules when the place of action is the same as either the place of 
injury or the forum, the structure of these cases is as follows: 
(1) 
I C&T 
~ A F C&T 
(2) 




i C&T ~ 
F notC& T ) 
(4) 
























F notC& T ) 
(9) 
A
I notC&T ~ 
F C&T 
(10) 
I notC&T ~ A 
F C&notT) 
(11) 
I notC&T ) 
A )) 
F notC& T 


















F notC& T 
~) (1~ 
I C & not T) I not C & not T) 
A ) not TS & not TE A ) not TS & not TE 
F notC&notT) F notC&notT) 
Solely for the purposes of argument and in order to put the 
best possible complexion on the present English and American 
rules as traditionally stated in the cases, we ignore initially what 
has throughout been urged as crucial, namely that the types of 
tort involved and the interests to which they therefore give rise, 
as well as the domicile and nationality of the parties, are extreme-
ly relevant. Conceding this, some of the sixteen cases, numbers 
(1), (3), (6), (8), (9), (11), (14) and (16) are prima facie likely to 
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be correctly decided in both England and the United States. Even 
of these cases, numbers (1), (3), (9), and (11) may, if the American 
rules are strictly applied, result in a dubious denial of remedy 
even though the conduct is tortious by the law of all relevant 
jurisdictions. Thus in Slater v. Mexican National Railway, where 
the remedy available under the lex loci delicti commissi ap-
parently could not be administered by the ordinary procedures 
of the forum, the injured plaintiff was denied relief at the forum. 
Where this may reasonably mean that he is left remediless be-
cause the defendant's assets are situated at the forum, which may 
also be the only place where the defendant can be served, it is 
suggested that the Slater decision may produce an unfortunate 
result; particularly is this so where, as in (1), (3), and (9), the con-
duct is also criminal by the laws of one or both of the-jurisdic-
tions, yet the defendant is in fact not amenable to the criminal 
jurisdiction of either. 
It is unfortunate that the proposed Restatement of the Con-
fiict of Laws, Second may perpetuate the reasoning in the Slater 
decision since section 117g provides, "A state does not exercise 
judicial jurisdiction where any judgment rendered by its courts 
would impose upon the defendant a more onerous, or a sub-
stantially different, duty than that which would be imposed upon 
him by the applicable foreign law." 
If the structure of each of the above eight cases is more close-
ly examined, it will be seen that the only variance between them 
is a variance as to the criminality of the conduct according to one 
of the relevant laws and that characterization as to tortiousness is 
therefore the same by both. In all the remaining cases, the prob-
able result on the traditional view of either an English or Ameri-
can court, both classifying the same situation in the same way, can 
be supported or rejected, dependent on factors which, according 
to the decided cases, are generally considered to be irrelevant. 
Interestingly enough, in six of these eight cases, the conclusions 
which would normally be reached in England and the United 
States are flatly contradictory despite an identical characterization 
of the threshold problem. In the remaining two cases, where Eng-
land and the United States would probably agree in their con-
clusion, they would merely agree to deny a remedy. 
It is worth considering a different illustration for each of the 
remaining eight situations to see how the traditional rules if they 
are applied in all cases in accordance with the dicta of the courts 
will sometimes clearly reach unsatisfactory results. 
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Case (2): If I and A are. the same, the American result would 
seem at ·first sight preferable to the English which would deny any 
action even though the conduct would be wrongful if committed 
within the jurisdiction. But if A and F are the same, i.e., the 
forum is also the place of the wrongful act, this is rather more 
questionable. If a forum can punish the act criminally, as it the-
oretically can· since the conduct occurred there, it may properly 
consider its own public policy against allowing an action in tort to. 
be strong enough to justify denial of a civil remedy, particularly 
since it would be able to punish the wrongdoer criminally. But 
if it cannot do so because he is not within the jurisdiction, it may 
even in this case feel more entitled to allow an action in tort. 
Cases (4) and (12): If I and A are the same, this may be the 
case referred to above where the law of I makes it slanderous 
per se to call a white man the friend of a Negro, in which case 
the English result may seem preferable to the American. But this 
is an exceptional case. In most cases the American result is likely 
to be the more desirable. 
If F and A are the same, however, the English and American 
rules may agree in denying an action since, even under the 
American rule, an exception is made by section 382 of the Re-
statement where a defendant acts in pursuance of a duty or "pur-
suant to a privilege conferred by the law of the place of acting," 
and without negligence injures the plaintiff in another juris-
diction. 
Cases (5) and (7): If I and A are the same, then this is like 
Machado v. Fontes~ although in case (7) a criminal action may 
not have been permitted in England had all the events occurred 
there. If a criminal action would have been possible in England, 
then there may be all the more reason for applying English law. 
The reason for doing so would be even stronger if A and F are 
the same. This suggests that either the American or English re-
sult may be appropriate dependent upon circumstances, but on 
balance, especially where A and F are the same and the conduct 
would there be criminal [as in (5)], the English rule appears more 
likely to be satisfactory. There is a distinction to be drawn be-
tween (5) and (7): where in addition to being tortious, the act is 
in fact criminal since committed at the forum [case (5)] it may 
be proper to allow the forum to grant a civil remedy which by its 
internal law it additionally attaches to such criminal conduct. 
Case (10): If I and A are the same, the American rule is prima 
facie preferaqle since the application of the English rule results 
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in denial of any remedy even though the conduct is ,vrongful by 
both relevant laws. These are borderline cases however-thus 
although, if certain consequences ensue, seduction may be a tort 
by English internal law and may be criminal as well, nonetheless 
the English conflict of laws rule may deny relief if the seduction, 
in the given situation, does not have such consequences. It may be 
that if the English policy in such cases is particularly strong in 
denying access generally to its civil courts, in view of the sordid 
and personal nature of the problem and the possibility of black-
mail, it should deny such an action; if the policy of the forum is 
somewhat weaker, then the attitude of the English courts may 
reflect an unfortunately restrictive conception of the function 
of private international law, as was the case in the United States 
in matters of wrongful death prior to the general adoption of 
statutes modelled on Lord Campbell's Act. 
If F and A are the same, and there is criminal jurisdiction in 
the forum, then the case is stronger for permitting weight to be 
accorded to the policy of the forum. This does not necessarily 
mean that it should enforce the foreign tort merely because it 
considers the act wrongful but rather that, since it deliberately 
omits to make the conduct tortious by its internal law but makes 
it criminal, it may be justified in disallowing a civil remedy, 
particularly if there is a likelihood of criminal proceedings. 
Case (13): If I and A are the same, the questionability of both 
the English and American conclusions has already been il-
lustrated by the case of the Englishman who, shortly before 
World War II, took too seriously the idea that when in Germany 
he should do as the Germans do. It may be that in such circum-
stances the concept of extraterritorial tort liability may, if ap-
plied in appropriate situations, not be outrageous. If F and A 
are the same, this argument would seem to have added force. 
Case (15): If I and A are the same, the argument in favor of 
granting a remedy may still be a strong one in certain circum-
stances. To adopt in part the previous illustration, if an English-
man in Germany on business between 1933 and 1939 writes to a 
German firm mistakenly that one of his English competitors is 
believed to be Jewish, the statement might be privileged by Ger-
man law but not by English law. The place of publication, which 
by the latter is decisive, is Germany, even though the effect of the 
injury may be felt in England. Why should the action be denied 
where both parties are English, where the loss is felt in England, 
and where the forum is England which adopts a policy strongly 
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opposed to that of Germany? It might be thought that American 
courts today would allow an action because they would consider 
that the place of injury is, for example, the place of the plain-
tiff's residence, but even under this more liberal view, they would 
probably still require publication at the place of residence. If F 
and A are the same, a like situation may occur where the letters 
are written and sent from England. 
The analysis of the sixteen possibilities for a relatively simple 
case has been offered in some detail to suggest the many com-
plexities which may develop even here and to show that rules in 
private international law should operate with a flexibility seldom 
found in the decided cases. Here, as in other fields of law, courts 
have developed rules of decision suitable for paradigmatic cases 
and then applied them unimaginatively to penumbra! situations 
where different or perhaps additional considerations should have 
prevailed. The more complex the structure of the cases, the more 
obvious it is that the rules which are generally applied at present 
are far too limited to deal suitably with many situations which 
were not envisaged when those rules were originally formulated 
in a far simpler social context. Thus, for example, workmen's 
compensation laws which were unheard of when Phillips v. Eyre 
was decided in 1870 now make it impossible to adopt a simple 
analysis of certain conduct in terms solely of crime and tort or 
to employ criteria of justifiability. Indeed, because of the mul-
tiple ramifications and policy factors touching the interests of 
social order, some American courts, 1vith the approval of the 
Supreme Court, have in recent years openly adopted an interest-
weighing approach. 
VIL CRITIQUE OF SOME RECENT DECISIONS 
In light of the discussion thus far it may be interesting to 
examine some of the more recent cases involving torts in English 
and American conflict of laws. Unfortuately, for reasons which 
have already been given, there are so few English cases that it is 
difficult to make a comparative study of many of the issues which 
abound in cases decided by American courts. For example, Eng-
lish judges have not yet had occasion to consider properly 
whether the rules promulgated in Phillips v. Eyre and Machado v. 
Fontes can adequately cope with such problems as direct action 
liability of insurers, infringement of trade-secrets, immunity of 
charities, survival and revival of actions, family disabilities, and 
joint tortfeasors; and there is little authority on such basic ques-
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tions as damages, limitations, or vicarious responsibility.64 It may, 
however, be instructive to attempt some comparative examination 
of a number of these issues which have been considered in a few 
recent cases. 
Although in Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink65 the English court of 
appeal treated the matter as one of municipal law, the case never-
theless raised questions which are of importance for the purposes 
of private international law. The defendant, when Chief Military 
Prosecutor for the Czechoslovak army, sent an allegedly defama-
tory communication to the "Military Office or Chancellery of the 
President of the Czechoslovak Republic." At this time the Czech 
government recognized by Great Britain was situated in England. 
It was found by the trial judge that by the law of Czechoslovakia 
the communication would have been absolutely privileged since 
it dealt with some aspect of government business, namely the 
defendant's suspicions as to the plaintiff's loyalty to the govern-
ment and that consequently no civil remedy would be available 
by Czech law. However, even under that law, the plaintiff might 
have availed himself of a proceeding, "which has no exact parallel 
in (English) law, but appears to be a formal demand for a prose-
cution which was, in this case, for misuse of official power."66 
This aspect of the case is not much dealt with in the opinions of 
the trial or appellate courts and hence it is not shown whether 
by Czech law the defendant's conduct was not justifiable so as to 
have brought the case within the purview of Machado v. Fontes. 
The trial court held that as a matter of comity the English court 
should apply the Czech law and treat the communication as 
absolutely privileged. On appeal, it was held: "Here everything 
happened in England. Having due regard to the exceptional 
position of the Czechoslovak Government, we do not think that 
the principle of the comity of nations compels or entitles the 
courts of this country to apply Czechoslovak law to acts done 
64 American courts at least have dealt with all of these problems. See, e.g., Watson 
v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (direct action); Ferroline Corp. 
v. General Aniline and Film Corp., (7th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 912, and Turntable 
Products Co. v. R.C.A., 155 N.Y.S. (2d) 73 (1956) (trade secrets); Jeffrey v. Whitworth 
College, (E.D. Wash. 1955) 128 F. Supp. 219 (charitable immunities); Ormsby v. Chase, 
290 U.S. 387 (1933) (survival); Ekstrom v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 338 
(revival). See Part X infra (family disabilities), Part IX infra (damages): Canadian Pacific 
Ry. Co. v. Johnston, (2d Cir. 1894) 61 F. 738 (statute of limitation); Young v. Masci, 
289 U.S. 253 (1933) (vicarious liability). 
65 [1947] K.B. I. 
66Id. at 10. 
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here, in proceedings in tort between Czechoslovak citizens, that 
law giving a general protection in civil suits to acts done by offi-
cials, which is not afforded under our law."67 However, by find-
ing that the communication enjoyed a qualified privilege under 
English law, the court of appeal was able to dismiss the appeal. 
In a sense, this case is the converse of the hypothetical case 
discussed above dealing ·with an Englishman who injures an 
English Jew in Germany. Particularly in view of the location of 
the government of Czechoslovakia recognized by Great Britain, 
was it not at least somewhat misleading to say, as did Somerville, 
L. J ., that "Here everything happened in England"? If all the 
important contacts had been with England then the case was 
properly decided by applying only the internal law of the forum. 
On the other hand, since at the time of the alleged defamation 
rieither the plaintiff nor the defendant was apparently domiciled 
in England, was there not at least some significant contact with 
a jurisdiction other than that of the forum and place of action? 
Here England was the place of action, injury, and forum, but 
only if "in jury" is construed to be limited to the initial damage 
which a defamed person may suffer upon publication. Where, 
as here, the alleged defamation was likely to pursue the plaintiff 
upon his return to Czechoslovakia and permanent damage to 
his reputation would probably be felt there, and where the al-
leged defamation would have injured him in his official relation-
ship vis-a-vis the Czechoslovak Government, then clearly impor-
tant considerations were raised which were liable to be ignored 
by applying the internal law of the forum. True, all the physical 
acts occurred in England, but this was only so because the govern-
ment of Czechoslovakia was then temporarily situated in Eng-
land. 
Where, as in cases of defamation, the wrong is not to substance 
but to feelings or reputations, then, as suggested by Gordon v. 
Parker~ it becomes particularly difficult to decide what is the in-
jury which is to be used for determining the place of injury. 
Recent American decisions, discussed below, involving defama-
tion or invasion of the right of privacy68 have revealed a consider-
67 Id. at 12. 
68 See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., (3d Cir. 1956) 229 F. 
(2d) 481; Bernstein v. N.B.C., (D.C. D.C. 1955) 129 F. Supp. 817. The former case is 
particularly interesting in that it develops two quite different and in some ways contrast-
ing "rights of privacy." 
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ably less mechanical approach to this problem than has been true 
of the more usual conflict of laws situations involving physical in-
jury. Thus, courts have sometimes been willing to use the plain-
tiff's domicile as the place of injury in cases involving multi-state 
publications, recognizing that despite publication elsewhere, it 
is at the domicile that the plaintiff will probably suffer the great-
est humiliation and loss of reputation, etc. 69 No case, however, 
has yet gone so far as to apply the law of the plaintiff's domicile 
where, although the damage was suffered there, the publication 
was made elsewhere. But that it may sometimes be appropriate 
to apply the lex domicilii even then is suggested by the following 
case: A, who is contemplating supplying goods to P on credit, 
engages the services of D, a credit-rating company, to investigate 
P's financial status. A and P are both domiciled in X where they 
carry on business while D's principal office is in Y. D sends an in-
correct credit rating to A in X. The letter is not opened in X but 
is sent to Y where A is vacationing. A reads the letter in Y and 
on his return to X declines to do business with P. By the law of Y, 
the communication is not actionable since it was made honestly. 
By the law of X a higher duty is placed on credit-rating companies 
and the communication would be actionable. In an action in Y, 
might it not be appropriate to apply the law of X where the 
damage was suffered, where the defendant expected his letter 
to be read and acted upon, and where the addressee and the plain-
tiff were both domiciled? This argument would be all the more 
forcible if the law of Y were the same as the law of X but the 
letter were forwarded to A in state Z which imposes a lesser duty 
on credit-rating companies. It is worth noting in this connection 
that the view of the German Reichsgericht was that "torts com-
mitted by letter or through the press are deemed to have been 
committed in every state or country in which any of the operative 
facts occurred" and that "of the several laws the one that is most 
favorable to the party injured is to be applied."70 This view, if 
applied mechanically, may work unjust hardship on the defend-
ant where the contacts with a state may be so nebulous that it 
would be obviously unfair to apply its law in favor of the plain-
tiff. Some writers have been willing to approve this view provided 
69 Bernstein v. N.B.C., (D.C. D.C. 1955) 129 F. Supp. 817. 
70 Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," 47 L.Q. R.Ev. 483 at 492 and 
493 (1931). 
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the original act was intentional or the defendant was indifferent 
to the consequences of his act. 71 With this one can find rather 
more sympathy, particularly in the latter instance, although it 
may still impose too heavy a burden on the defendant in cases 
where the act is bona fide and committed without negligence. 
In the hypothetical case cited above, however, as perhaps in the 
Fink case, is there not a strong argument for applying the law 
of a foreign jurisdiction to a situation which the usual rules 
would require to be governed by the internal law of the forum? 
Unless the contacts with foreign jurisdictions are more closely 
and carefully assessed and are not left concealed by the applica-
tion of rigid rules governing the location of the place of wrong 
or the place of injury, considerable injustice may ensue. If the 
court of appeal in the Fink case had not found that the com-
munication enjoyed qualified privilege under English law, a 
communication by a Czech official to a Czech official about a 
Czech official intended to affect his status as a Czech official and 
likely to cause him permanent injury in Czechoslovakia, the case 
would have resulted in a right of damages being granted mainly 
because the exigencies of war had compelled the temporary dis-
location of the Czechoslovak Government. 
In a recent California case,72 an interesting result was reached 
in a defamation action where there was publication in several 
jurisdictions, in all but one of which (the forum) there was ap-
parently no need to satisfy certain formalities in order to recover 
general damages. However, a statute at the forum required that, 
before such damages could be recovered, "[p ]laintiff shall serve 
upon the publisher . . . written notice specifying the statements 
claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same be cor-
rected. "73 Although the plaintiff made a written demand for cor-
rection, he failed to specify the libelous passages, and was denied 
general damages by the court, despite the fact that such specifica-
tion was apparently not required by the laws of the three other 
places of publication. The court stated: 
"We hold that Section 48a of the Civil Code of California 
declares the public policy of the state of California and that 
recovery will not be permitted in a California court for the 
71 Id. at 494. 
72 Anderson v. Hearst Publishing Co., (S.D. Cal. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 850. 
73 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §48(a). 
1958] TORTS IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 1105 
tort of libel occurring in a foreign state, when the recovery 
for such tort, if it had occurred in California, would not be 
permitted in the California court because of Section 48a 
Civil Code."74 
In this case, where the defendant was not a domiciliary of 
California while the plaintiff apparently was, the court, ignoring 
what would have been appropriate, namely, the connection of the 
entire transaction with the forum, instead rested the result upon 
the considerably more dubious public policy argument which it 
extracted from the statute. The closeness of the connection with 
California can further be inferred from the fact that the plain-
tiff brought the three other places of publication into the action 
only by amending his complaint after becoming aware of the 
barrier interposed by section 48a. Although this strengthens the 
argument for applying California law, that law would better have 
been applied on the basis that California was the place most con-
cerned with any injuries suffered by the plaintiff, especially since, 
although the case is silent on this, it is possible that no damage 
was suffered elsewhere. It is unfortunate that the court should 
have reached this result by resorting to its own public policy, 
not because of an interest-weighing approach, but because the 
California statute merely reflected a strong local policy. Tliis 
should not be enough: to attach crucial importance to a statute 
at the forum so as to exclude foreign interests can only be jus-
tified after considering the weight which should properly be 
attached to such interests. Indeed, the court, after noting the 
multi-state publication cases, concluded, "We find nothing in 
these authorities to change our decision. By our decision we 
avoid the problems inherent in at least some of the last cited 
authorities."75 Even though the conclusion reached by the court 
was probably justified, it seems doubtful whether it was entitled 
to state: "We believe enforcement in California of a cause of 
action for libel, arising in another state, and where plaintiff runs 
afoul of Section 48a, Civil Code of California, offends against the 
public policy of the state of California."76 Even assuming that 
the court was following the single publication theory for multi-
state publications, its application of California internal law would 
74 Anderson v. Hearst Publishing Co., (S.D. Cal. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 850 at 856. 
75 Id. at 857. 
16 Id. at 856. 
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be warranted only where there was good reason for treating 
California as the place of that single publication or where it 
treated another state as the place of that single publication but 
its own public policy was so strong as to deny relief on that 
publication elsewhere. Where, however, the court does not fol-
low that theory, it is questionable to require the plaintiff to have 
satisfied California internal law, when suing in California on a 
defamation which occurred elsewhere. While the result in the 
Anderson case appears to be founded on the single publication 
theory, the court's analysis of the case is not apparently so 
founded and thus gives rise to the doubts here expressed. The 
issue at stake is whether there is "a" place of injury whose law 
therefore applies to all the substantive incidents of recovery, or 
whether, although as here California may be the place of primary 
injury, there is nevertheless a defamation wherever there is a pub-
lication and hence, even in California, the plaintiff can sue on 
a foreign tort and not merely on a tort which involves conduct in 
a foreign jurisdiction. It is worth noting that in the year following 
the Anderson decision, California adopted the Uniform Single 
Publication Act.77 
Another recent American case raises a further problem as 
to the limitations created by the rigid application of the place 
of injury criterion to determine the applicable law. In Walton v. 
Arabian American Oil Company}8 the Second Circuit was faced 
with a situation where the plaintiff, an American, had been in-
jured in Saudi Arabia by an agent of the defendant, an American 
oil company. Here there could be no argument as to the place of 
the tort, if that meant only the place of initial physical impact. 
Rather the question here was whether the law of Saudi Arabia, 
where the accident took place, would make the defendant liable. 
The plaintiff argued. unsuccessfully that since there was no "law" 
in the ·ordinary sense of the term at the place of the tort, the 
court should assume and apply those basic rules of tort law, 
recognized by civilized nations, on which the plaintiff's cause of 
action was founded. Judge Frank, for the court, while favorably 
impressed by Morris' arguments for applying the proper law of 
a tort,79 felt constrained to reject the plaintiff's theory since the 
77 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949; Supp. 1957) §3425. 
78 (2d Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 541. 
79 Morris, "The Proper Law of a Tort," 64 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1951). 
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court's jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and the 
case had to be decided by the conflict of laws rules of New York. 
Despite the provision in New York for judicial recognition of 
foreign law, the court sustained the ruling below that the plaintiff 
had a duty to acquaint the court with the "law" of Saudi Arabia. 
It is quite clear that the rulings of both the lower and appel-
late courts were foregone conclusions so long as those courts were 
unwilling to abandon the rules crystallized in the Restatement 
and in numerous decisions which treat the place of physical im-
pact as the place of principal injury. Despite the already men-
tioned departures from these rules reflected in some recent Amer-
ican defamation and invasion of privacy cases, there have not 
been encouraging signs of a similar reappraisal in cases where it 
is easy to state with certainty, "it was in X that the plaintiff was 
run over and therefore X is the place of injury." All cases con-
tinue to follow the rules as though they were based on an undeni-
able syllogism, that (1) the law of the place of injury is the law 
to govern a foreign tort; (2) the place of physical impact is the 
place of injury; and therefore (3) the law of that place governs 
the tort. What has many times been urged in this paper and what 
in essence Morris proposes in his theory of a "proper law of a 
tort,"80 is that even though the major premise is acceptable, the 
second may not be and therefore the conclusion may be invalid. 
Instead, it is urged that in a case like Walt on the place of "in jury" 
is not the place where the plaintiff is run over but rather, as in 
cases of defamation or invasion of privacy, the place where the 
plaintiff is unable to support his family or to continue his work 
or loses his reputation or may become a public responsibility, 
that is, his domicile or residence. It has already been recognized 
by the Supreme Court in workmen's compensation cases involv-
ing contract and tort that flexibility is essential and that the mere 
fact that the accident occurred in state X or the plaintiff was en-
gaged in state Y is not determinative per se.81 It is, of course, more 
difficult to apply such a test and, as many writers have observed, 
one of the primary, if not the primary advantage of the Restate-
ment rule is its relative ease of application. It is the present sub-
80 Ibid. 
81 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 306 
U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 
294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
ll08 MICHIGAN LAw R.Evmw [ Vol. 56 
mission, however, that too high a price is sometimes paid for ease 
of application and predictability of result. Although it is true 
that in commercial transactions ease and predictability are often 
as important as securing a just result in a given situation, the argu-
ment does not necessarily apply, let alone apply automatically, 
to cases of personal injury whether to 'substance or feelings. Is 
Mr. Walton better off for having known in advance that his injury 
would probably not be compensable in New York if he could 
not show that the "law" of Saudi Arabia would sustain the defend-
ant's liability for the tortious conduct of his agent? Even though 
the law of the place of conduct should regulate that conduct 
where no foreign contact is involved, why should this be appli-
cable in all instances involving foreign contacts, particularly 
when· the "law" of the place of conduct may be virtually non-
existent or so outrageous that it offends the standards of civilized 
people. When, as today, English and American citizens are being 
increasingly employed abroad, whether for business, govern-
mental or philanthropic purposes, in countries whose standards 
of conduct and criteria of civil liability, or incidents attaching 
thereto, differ markedly from those en joyed in the Wes tern 
world, why should those standards or criteria govern the relations 
between two Englishmen or two Americans when the effect of 
those relations will be felt primarily in England and America? 
Even as between jurisdictions whose standards of civilization 
are comparable and whose rules are substantially similar, con-
siderable in justice may arise from treating as crucial the place 
of physical impact where far more important contacts exist with 
another state and would warrant application of its law. This is 
particularly well illustrated by a recent Scottish case which has 
been strongly criticized by a number of writers.82 In M'Elroy v. 
McAllister,83 one Glasgow resident was killed by another Glas-
gow resident in England. The decedent's widow could have 
recovered substantial damages in Scotland had the accident oc-
curred there or in England if she had sued within a year. She 
sued in Scotland after a year and it was held that she could re-
cover only funeral expenses which were the sole item recoverable 
82 MORRIS, CASES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d ed., 228 (1951); CHESHIRE, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4th ed., 260 (1952); GRAVESON, THE CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d 
ed., 433 (1955). 
83 [1949] S.C. llO. 
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under both English and Scottish law. As Morris has remarked, 
"Is the difficulty [of determining the proper law of the tort] any 
greater than that of determining the proper law of the contract 
or the place where an interstate tort is committed?"84 
VIII. THE PLACE OF THE INJURY 
We have already mentioned in the context of interstate pub-
lication some of the difficulties which may arise in trying to locate 
the place where a tort is committed. Recent cases show that 
similar difficulties are likely to arise in many other contexts, such 
as fraudulent misrepresentation, disclosure of trade secrets, and 
negligence. Thus, in George Monro Ltd. v. American Cyanamid 
and Chemical Corp., 85 the defendants manufactured and sold in 
the United States a product for destroying vermin. One ultimate 
user, an English farmer, successfully sued the plaintiffs, the 
English distributors of the product. When they in turn attempted 
to sue the defendants and serve them in New York with notice 
of an English writ, their right to obtain service outside the juris-
diction was challenged since, by the rules of the English Supreme 
Court, relating to tort, this depended on whether the action was 
founded on a tort committed in England.86 It was held by the 
English court of appeal that "as the affidavit filed in support of 
the application for service of the writ out of the jurisdiction did 
not disclose facts showing that . . . the tort alleged as a cause of 
action was committed within the jurisdiction, the service of the 
writ out of the jurisdiction was not permitted .... "87 In view of 
the defective state of the pleadings and the possible interference 
with the "exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign power" of the 
State of New York, which was greatly stressed by the court of 
appeal, the decision is not on its face objectionable. However, 
some of the language used, particularly by Lord Justice Goddard, 
implies that in order to invoke rule ll(l)(ee), the act as well as 
the injury must have occurred in England, i.e., the rule "is aim-
ing at . . . the case where a foreigner comes to this country and 
84 MORRIS, CASES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d ed., 228 (1951). 
85 [1944] K.B. 432. 
86 See R.S.C. Order xi, rule l(ee). 
87 George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chemical Corp., [1944] K.B. 432 
at 433. 
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commits a tort in this country, for instance, in driving a motor 
car and running someone down by negligent driving."88 This is 
not exceptionable if the reasoning is confined to the application 
of the rule but its implications may be rather more sweeping. 
A line was clearly drawn between the conduct and its con-
sequences-"In an action on the case, the cause of action is the 
wrongful act or default of the defendant. The right to bring the 
action depends on the happening of damage to the 'plaintiff.' "89 
Although the American rule locating the wrong where the last 
event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes 
place may ignore the interest of the place of conduct, this inter-
pretation of rule ll(l)(ee), if employed for the justifiability pur-
poses of Machado v. Fontes, is equally likely to ignore the interests 
of the state where the injury is suffered. Subsequently, in Bata v. 
Bata,90 this interpretation of the rule was distinguished, as indeed 
Lord Justice Goddard suggested it might be in such a case, for 
there the allegedly defamatory letter was published in England, 
though written in Switzerland, and service of notice of the writ 
in Switzerland was permitted. 
It should be noted, however, that the contract aspect of the 
Cyanamid case undoubtedly influenced the court in its interpreta-
tion of the rule even in relation to its tort provisions. Scott, L. J ., 
stated: 
"This is not the kind of case where service ought to be per-
mitted outside the jurisdiction unless quite exceptional cir-
cumstances are shown. . . . It is most important that the 
realities of the case should be considered. So far as I can 
judge, the agreement made between the plaintiffs and the 
corporation was one by which the corporation were seek-
ing carefully, with the consent of the plaintiffs, to keep all 
claims against them within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States.''91 
Whereas in the Cyanamid case the court apparently con-
sidered the contractual relationship as an element in locating 
the place of injury, and thereby indirectly avoided the imposi-
tion of tort liability, in Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting 
88 Id. at 439-440. 
89 Id. at 439. 
90 [1948] W.N. 366, 92 Sol. J. 574. 
91 [1944] K.B. 432 at 437-438. 
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Co.,92 the contract, in effect, served as the basis for the imposition 
of tort liability. In the Daniels case the result was achieved by 
characterizing the threshold problem as one of contract rather 
than tort. In this case the vehicle was rented in Connecticut to 
Mr. Sack who while driving with Levy, the plaintiff, in Mas-
sachusetts was involved in a collision with one Meginn. The 
plaintiff's injury was due to the concurrent negligence of both 
Sack and Meginn. A statute of Connecticut provided, "Any per-
son renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him 
shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused 
by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased." 
Plaintiff relying upon this statute sought recovery from the Auto 
Renting Co. despite the fact that by the law of Massachusetts 
no such liability was imposed upon persons who rent motor 
vehicles and here, unlike the Cyanamid case, there was no doubt 
as to the place of the tort. The Connecticut court sustained the 
argument of the plaintiff. Stumberg correctly points out: 
"[M]easured by the standard ordinarily applied by American 
courts in tort cases, the decision is unsound. It may, how-
ever, be undesirable always to apply the usual standard. In 
the instant case the State of Connecticut had sufficient in-
terest in the business of renting cars there to warrant applica-
tion of its own law. If its social policy is in fact one with re-
spect to the business of renting cars, its courts are justified 
in placing emphasis upon the fact that the car was rented in 
Connecticut rather than upon the fact that the injury oc-
curred in Massachusetts."93 
Unfortunately, the court adhered to the Restatement rules for 
torts and said, "A liability ex delicto is created by the law of the 
place of the delict." Therefore in order to grant relief under 
the Connecticut statute it was necessary for the court to character-
ize the action as one other than in tort. By stating that the pur-
pose of the statute was primarily "to protect the safety of traffic 
upon highways ... " the court would have been giving the statute 
extraterritorial effect if the basis for imposing liability upon 
Daniels was the accident in Massachusetts. However, if the basis 
of liability is the conduct of renting the car in Connecticut, ir-
respective of where the damage occurs (provided it does occur) 
92108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928). See note 10 supra. 
113 STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 204 (1951). 
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then it is not giving the statute extraterritorial effect to impose 
liability upon a Connecticut car renter, particuliarly if the in-
jury were suffered by one domiciliary of Connecticut and in-
flicted by another. Here, as in Gordon v. Parker, why should 
the forum which was also the place of action but not injury 
deny effect to its own law where the forum does have substantial 
contacts and important interests in regulating conduct within 
its borders? 
A further important problem may arise where the alleged 
wrong may also constitute, or result from, a breach of contract. 
In such cases, the influence of the contractual element upon the 
choice of law which is to govern the tort may vary dependent on 
the type of tort-contract situation involved. The plaintiff's elec-
tion to sue on the tort and not on the breach of contract may be 
crucial because of a different rule relating to measure, remoteness 
or limitation of damages, or, for example, because of statutes of 
limitation or difficulties of proof. When, however, the plaintiff 
elects to sue on the tort, should the influence of the contract be 
ignored? In some cases, it may be irrelevant that there is a con-
tract in the chain of events which may affect the liability of some-
one as a result of the acts which gave rise to the plaintiff's cause 
of action. For example, in Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc.,94 the 
defendant sold in New York to a wholesaler in Ohio some canned 
meat imported from South America. A customer in Ohio pur-
chased a can of the meat from a grocer who had bought from the 
wholesaler. In a subsequent action in New York based on the 
death of the customer which allegedly was due to eating the con-
tents of the can, the court rightly applied Ohio law, holding the 
New York defendant liable, and was not concerned, in choosing 
the law governing the tort, with the contractual duty owed by 
the defendant to the wholesaler. Since the Ohio law made the 
sale of unwholesome food a criminal offense and negligence per 
se, there could be no question as to the conduct not being neg-
ligent, regardless of what the contract provided. 
In Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,95 however, a Pennsylvania 
manufacturer was sued by the widow of a decedent who had pur-
chased a plane in Alabama from a distributor of the defendant. 
The widow sought to recover in Pennsylvania for her husband's 
94 (2d Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 970. 
95 (M.D. Pa. 1955) 18 F.R.D. 169. 
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wrongful death which had occurred in Georgia. Here the plain-
tiff had to prove negligence and pleaded both breach of warranty 
and negligence in her action. In a preliminary decision on a pro-
cedural point, the court stated, "It is Georgia law which pre-
scribes the standard of care that the defendant must have ob-
served .... "96 Even though there was probably no contractual 
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, it would seem 
that the standard for determining whether or not negligence was 
present, prescribed by the law governing the contract, or to a 
lesser extent, by the law of the place of manufacture, may appear 
sometimes to be more relevant than that of the place of accident, 
which may be completely fortuitous. As between sister states of 
the Union, whose standards in regard to non-negligent manufac-
ture are likely to be substantially similar, the application of the 
law of the place of accident to the exclusion of the law of the 
place of sale or manufacture probably would not crucially affect 
the result of the case. Particularly in regard to planes and auto-
mobiles, manufacturers must be aware that their products are 
likely to be used in other parts of the country and should there-
fore be prepared to satisfy the standards of other American juris-
dictions. Where, however, the place of the accident is a juris-
diction whose law is markedly different in imposing a far greater 
or far lesser standard of care, it may be doubtful whether the de-
termination as to negligent manufacture should be made by that 
law. 
In Hunter v. Derby Foods and Smith v. Piper Aircraft there 
was no contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants although there were other contracts which the court 
might have considered as significant. Where, however, there exists 
a contract between the parties so that an election would at first 
appear to be available, as where the defendant carrier is sued by 
the plaintiff as representative of the decedent's estate, then even 
in this case there may not be any election available. The Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was required to deal with such 
a case in Maynard v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,97 where a passenger 
purchased in New York a ticket for Boston and was negligently 
killed in an airplane crash in Connecticut. It was held that al-
though the contract was made in New York, no recovery could 
96 Id. at 171. 
97 (2d Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 139. 
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be had except under the Connecticut death statute which limited 
recovery to $20,000. The court said: 
"But plaintiff argues that an action to recover more than 
$20,000 will lie since the decedent purchased his ticket in 
New York and there arose an implied contract safely to trans-
port, governed by the law of the place where the contract 
was made. The difficulty with this argument is that at com-
mon law there was no remedy for negligently causing the 
death of another and recovery of any damages arising from 
death through negligence depends on the existence of some 
such statute as was first adopted in Lord Campbell's Act."98 
In Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc.99 the defendant 
attempted to take advantage of a contractual limitation upon 
recovery. Here, however, the New York Court of Appeals did 
not rely upon the lex loci delicti commissi to strike out the con-
tractual claim made by the defendant but held instead that the 
limitation upon liability was invalid by the law which properly 
governed the contract. It was therefore held that the death stat-
ute of the lex loci delicti commissi alone governed the measure 
of recovery. 
From these ticket cases it should not be concluded that the 
contract plays no role where the passenger is himself the plain-
tiff and sues for injury due to the negligence of the carrier. In 
such cases the basis of recovery is not some statutorily conferred 
right but results from the breach of the express or implied duty 
to transport safely. Although later New York decisions appear 
to diminish its vitality, such a result was reached by the New 
York Court of Appeals in 1871 in Dyke v. Erie Ry. Co.100 where 
the plaintiff's contractual right to recovery was not limited by 
the statutory limitation imposed by the lex loci delicti commissi. 
In a 1911 Kentucky decision,101 however, the plaintiff purchased 
at the forum a ticket to New York and was injured in Penn-
sylvania through the alleged negligence of the defendant. It was 
held that in such cases "the law is well settled by the great weight 
of authority, that the lex loci delicti governs, and not the lex 
98Id. at 140. 
99 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935). 
100 45 N.Y. 113 (1871). 
101 Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. & Penn. R. Co. v. Grom, 142 Ky. 51, 133 S.W. 
977 (19II). 
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loci contrac_tus, and the rights given by the lex loci delicti can 
only be defeated by defenses which are given under the lex loci 
delicti ... the carrier is liable because of the failure of duty with 
respect to that relationship [ which the passenger sustains to the 
carrier] rather than its failure to comply with an implied con-
dition of the contract of carriage."102 Although the two cases are 
contrary on the law, they concur in avoiding a limitation upon 
the plaintiff's right to recover and this they achieve, in the one 
instance, by giving effect to an adhesion contract103 while deny-
ing effect to the law of the place of impact and, in the other, by 
denying effect to such a contract while giving effect to the law of 
the place of impact. In these cases, therefore, the plaintiffs en-
joyed the advantages but did not suffer from the disadvantages 
of an adhesion contract. 
What would be likely to happen if this type of case were to 
be heard by an English court? If the court decides the threshold 
question to the effect that the case is one of contract and not 
tort, then the court would apply the proper law of contract and 
ignore the lex loci delicti commissi as well as its own internal 
law, subject only to the limitations imposed by its public policy. 
If, on the other hand, the threshold characterization is to the 
effect that the case is one of tort, the rules as interpreted in 
Machado v. Fontes would appear to be applicable, and the court 
would have to determine whether the act is not justifiable abroad 
and whether it would be actionable had it occurred in England. 
In the context of a contract-tort situation, the criteria of jus-
tifiability may be particularly unsatisfactory and lead to highly 
questionable results when according to the law of the place where 
England considered a tort to have been committed, there would 
be a remedy for breach of contract but no other remedy. It is to 
be hoped that in such a case the English forum will consider the 
defendant's act to have been not justifiable, just as in lvlachado 
v. Fontes conduct which was criminal but not tortious where 
committed was held to be not justifiable. It is admittedly more 
difficult to see why conduct should be considered as not justifi-
able when it gives rise to an action for breach of contract ratlier 
than a criminal prosecution, but it would be still more objection-
102 Id. at 56-57. 
103 See Ehrenzweig, "Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 53 CoL. L. REv. 
1072 (1953). 
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able to describe it as justifiable. It is surely wrong to deny any 
relief at the forum where its internal law and the law of the place 
where the conduct occurs concur in granting some civil remedy 
although they do this under a different type of characterization.1114 
Unfortunately, the Privy Council has held, for the purposes of 
Machado v. Fontes, that where according to the law of the place 
where the defendant's conduct occurs, relief is available only 
through workmen's compensation, then such conduct is "jus-
tifiable."105 This admittedly suggests the possibility that unlike 
conduct which is criminal where it occurs, conduct which there 
gives rise only to an action for breach of contract may, like work-
men's compensation cases, be held to be justifiable, at least in 
regard to the requirements of Machado v. Fontes. That such a 
parallel should not be draw can be seen from the fact that where-
as relief in workmen's compensation cases does not depend on 
any question of the defendant's culpability, relief for breach of 
contract will comparatively rarely result from a situation where 
the defendant is entirely free of fault. In addition, where the 
Privy Council holds that conduct producing only liability in work-
men's compensation cases is justifiable for the purposes of a tort 
action in England, it means that the plaintiff has available, or 
even more likely has already secured, some compensation under 
an appropriate workmen's compensation law. Where, on the 
other hand, a plaintiff sues on a foreign tort in England, it is most 
unlikely that he has already· been able to secure relief for breach 
of contract, and if he has, it is not likely that he could secure 
further recovery in tort for the same conduct which supported 
his action for breach of contract. The workmen's compensation 
cases where additional recovery in tort is denied by the Privy 
Council, because it finds that the conduct is justifiable where 
committed, deal with a problem quite familiar to American 
courts, some of which reach the same conclusion on rather 
different grounds.106 The decisions of the Privy Council appear 
somewhat startling when the conduct in question is said to be 
"justifiable" where committed, but when this unfortunate word is 
read in the proper context of Machado v. Fontes the results are 
104 But see note, 3 INT. &: CoMP. L.Q. 651 at 657 (1954). 
105 See Walpole v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., [1923] A.C. 113, and McMillan v. 
Canadian Northern Ry. Co., [1923] A.C. 120. 
106 See, e.g., Williamson v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., (9th Cir. 1955) 221 ]'. (2d) 5. 
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rather less objectionable and no more so than those of American 
courts which deny an injured workman the advantages of tort 
recovery against a third party where relief is already availaole 
to him under the workmen's compensation scheme. It is to be 
noted, however, that the United States Supreme Court has re-
cently held in Carroll v. Lanza101 that the place of the injury 
may allow the plaintiff to recover in tort against a third party 
tortfeasor even though he has already secured workmen's com-
pensation under the statute of another jurisdiction, that statute 
purporting to grant an exclusive remedy. Whether or not the 
actual decisions in Carroll v. Lanza and the two Privy Council 
cases108 are warranted depends on a consideration of a number 
of factors, including the weight which should be accorded to the 
competing policies of the various states, the closeness of the plain-
tiff's contacts with them, the adequacy of the relief which they 
would grant, and other social and legal factors. 
IX. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
One of the most important reasons for electing to sue in tort 
rather than in contract is the possibility of securing greater 
damages. However, even where no question of election arises, 
and the only remedy available is in tort, it may clearly be crucial 
to the outcome of the cases which law should govern the ques-
tions of damages. Here again there is relatively little authority 
in English law. Most of the cases suggest that all questions of 
damages are determinable by English law,1°9 whether because 
damages are treated as an issue relating to procedure rather than 
substance, or because even questions of substance are governed 
by English law once it has been found that the conduct was not 
justifiable by the foreign law. In Machado v. Fontes, the damages 
had, on the court's interpretation of Brazilian law,110 necessarily 
to be assessed by English law, since it was thought that the con-
duct would give rise only to criminal liability in Brazil without 
101 349 U.S. 408 (1955). 
10s In both Privy Council cases the (workmen's compensation) law which was applied 
exclusively was that of the place of injury which was also the place of the decedent's 
domicile. 
100 See, e.g., Kohnke v. Karger, (1951] 2 K.B. 670. 
110 See pp. 1089-1090 supra. 
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a right to compensation. Schmitthoff has deduced from the 
reasoning of the court of appeal that it 
"regarded the libellous statement as a crime only and not as 
a tort, in view of the well-known rule of the English conflict 
of laws that the measure of damages is an incident pertain-
ing to procedural law and is, therefore, governed by the lex 
fori. The reference of Lopes L. J. and Rigby L. J. to the 
remedial nature of the amount of damages put it beyond 
doubt that this was the ratio of their decision."111 
On the other hand, Falconbridge has stated that in Machado v. 
Fontes: 
" ... the court specifically applied the Phillips v. Eyre for-
mula, and the reference by the first condition in that for-
mula to the domestic law of England is not in terms limited 
to the procedural rules of that law, and there seems to be 
no reason why the reference should not be regarded as in-
cluding the right to damages and the measure of damages 
as part of the substantive rules of the domestic law of the 
forum. In other words, the existence and extent of the ob-
ligation are governed by the domestic rules of the law of the 
forum, and it is therefore immaterial whether the measure 
of damages is characterized as a matter of procedure, or, as 
I think it should be, as a matter of the substance of the ob-
ligation. "112 
Whichever of these views may seem preferable, the argument is 
largely academic if, in either event, English law is to be applied. 
Where, as in the United States, the distinction may entail the 
application of different rules of assessment, it is clearly essential 
to decide whether damages should be considered as an issue re-
lating to substance or to procedure. 
Sometimes an intermediate position is said to be adopted even 
in English law: thus the latest edition of Halsbury states that 
in actions for tort 
" ... the lex loci actus . . . [is] generally decisive as to remote-
ness of damages, but in certain cases the rules of Englisfi 
law, as the lex fori, may permit or require the measure of 
damages to be calculated in accordance with principles not 
recognised by the foreign law. Such special rules relating 
111 SCHMITTHOFF, THE ENGLISH CoNFLicr OF LAWS, 3d ed., 157 (1954). 
112 FALCONBRIDGE, ESSAYS ON THE CONFLicr OF LAws 19 (1947). 
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· to damages are in the nature of rules of procedure and the 
lex f ori will in such a case override all other relevant laws. "113 
In another passage, this view is repeated in a rather more qual-
ified manner: ". . . the question of remoteness of damage in an 
action in respect of a tort committed abroad is (it would seem) 
to be governed by the lex loci actus but the qualification [sic] 
of damage which is not too remote according to the lex loci actus 
is a matter for the lex fori." 114 Unfortunately, the main authorities 
for this statement, as given in the footnotes, are (1) a case decided 
in 1717,115 (2) a Scottish decision which repudiated Machado v. 
Fontes,116 and (3) a recent English contract decision which will 
be shortly considered.117 Moreover, in the same footnotes there is 
reference to a recent tort decision of Lynskey, J., in which he 
stated that "the principles upon which damages are assessed dif-
fer in different countries, but in assessing damages I must apply 
the law and practice of these courts."118 It is therefore very doubt-
ful whether the English courts would today permit, as they did 
in 1717, interest to be recovered for a foreign conversion of the 
plaintiff's goods or money at the rate current in the country 
where the conversion took place.119 It seems more probable that 
they would follow Wolff's interpretation of the English cases 
to the effect that 
" ... English municipal law, and not the law of the place of 
the ·wrongful act, decides whether reparation must be made 
for dommage moral as well as material damage, whether con-
tributory negligence merely diminishes or entirely destroys 
the claim, whether lost profits have to be taken into con-
sideration, whether the causal nexus between the act and 
the damage is to be denied on the ground of remoteness and 
the like ... the orbit within which the lex loci delicti is op-
erative is very limited; it is restricted to the question: is the 
act that caused the damage justifiable? All other questions 
must be answered by the (English) lex fori." 120 
11s 7 HALsllURY, THE LAws OF ENGLAND, 3d ed., 169 (1954). 
114 Id. at 86. 
115·Ekins v. East-India Co., 1 P. Wms. 395, 24 Eng. Rep. 441 (1717). 
116 Naftalin v. London Midland Scotish Ry. Co., [1933] S.C. 259. 
117 J. D'Almaeida Araujo Ltd. v. Becker &: Co., [1953] 2 Q.B. 329. 
118 Kohnke v. Karger, [1951] 2 K.B. 670 at 677. 
110 Ekins v. East-India Co., I P. Wms. 395, 24 Eng. Rep. 441 (1717). 
120 WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d ed., 493 (1950). 
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One would expect a rather different attitude toward the 
question of damages to be displayed by American courts in view 
of the general emphasis placed on recognizing obligations created 
by foreign law. The extent to which the obligati_o theory has in-
fluenced judges in the United States in regard to damages is 
particularly suggested by the numerous wrongful death actions 
in which it has been almost uniformly held that the amount, 
measure and limitation of damages are questions of substantive 
law and consequently governed by the lex loci delicti commissi. 
Indeed American courts have gone so far as to hold that the plain-
tiff may recover compensatory damages allowed by the foreign 
law instead of nominal or vindictive damages allowable by the 
lex fori and measurable by the defendant's degree of culpability; 
that the lex loci delicti commissi may be applied to deny an award 
of funeral expenses which would be permitted by the lex fori; 
that the plaintiff may recover damages for the decedent's mental 
anguish or suffering where such damages would not be recover-
able by the lex fori; that the lex loci delicti commissi may limit 
the quantum of damages which the lex fori would have awarded 
or may exceed the limitation which the lex f ori would have im-
posed; and that the amount of damages recoverable because of 
the decedent's contributory negligence may be reduced instead 
of barring the right to recovery as would the lex f ori.121 
In one recent case, in which an American court applied the 
line of reasoning indicated by these decisions, a particularly inter-
esting result ensued. Judge Frank, for the Second Circuit, in 
Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France122 was confronted 
with a situation in which the decedent had been killed in an air-
plane crash in Portugal according to whose law "moral damages" 
were recoverable. The decedent's mother secured an award under 
the workmen's compensation law of New York where her son 
had been resident and employed, but she failed to institute pro-
ceedings against the wrongful party within six months as required 
by the New York statute. A failure to comply with this require-
ment automatically makes the insurance carrier of the workmen's 
policy the statutory assignee under section 29(2) of the New 
121 In the four jurisdictions in which damages were at one time not treated as 
governed by the lex loci delicti commissi, there have since been decisions to the contrary. 
See 15 A.L.R. (2d) 762 at 767 (1951). 
122 (2d Cir. 1953) 209 F. (2d) 436. 
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York Workmen's Compensation Law of the cause of action for the 
decedent's wrongful death. However, it was held by the court 
that there could be no assignment under section 29(2) of the 
right to moral damages: " ... Since a claim for moral damages 
is not recoverable in New York or elsewhere in this country, we 
think it was not in the contemplation of the legislature and there-
fore does not pass under Section 29(2)."123 The court assumed 
that the cause of action for the decedent's wrongful death could 
not be split and consequently the claim for moral damages would. 
"evaporate" if the insurance carrier were assigned the cause of 
action. Despite the mother's failure to institute proceedings 
within the statutory period, the court reached a conclusion which 
typified Holmes' submission that the law is what the courts say 
it is, a submission to which Frank was not unsympathetic before 
his elevation to the bench. The mother was allowed to sue for her 
son's wrongful death although the interest of the insurance com-
pany was protected. Even more startling is the fact that the court 
expressly stated, on petition for rehearing, that the question re-
mained open as to whether she was entitled to recover moral 
damages under Portuguese law! 
Even allowing for the fact that the obligatio theory holds 
such sway in American courts, it is perhaps surprising that they 
have been willing to allow it to govern the question of damages 
when the parties are domiciliaries of the forum. Even though 
these courts are willing to concede that the fortuitous place of 
injury should determine whether a tort exists, it appears ex-
cessively mechanical to conclude in all cases that the lex loci 
delicti should necessarily determine the extent of the plaintiff's 
recovery. Although in many cases, the measure of recovery may 
be comparable as between sister states of the Union, neverthe-
less radical differences do exist, especially where limitations may 
by statute be imposed by one jurisdiction and not by another. 
Thus a workman may be injured by a fellow workman while 
working outside his home state and the state of his employment, 
and may forfeit a substantial part of the damages he would have 
recovered at his domicile because of the policy of the neighbor-
ing state which was primarily intended to be applicable to its 
own domiciliaries. Conversely, is it not questionable that a work-
man should recover more when injured by his fellow workman 
123 Id. at 439. 
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while working in a neighboring state than he would have recov-
ered in the 'state where ,both are domiciled and were employed? In 
attempting to -deal with this type of problem, article 12 of the 
Introductory Act to the German Civil Code perhaps goes too 
far in restricting the damages recoverable in a German court 
against a German citizen to those which would be recoverable 
in Germany.124 Thus, "If the defendant has no capacity to com-
mit the tort by German law, or if delictual liabilty under German 
law does not exist in the absence of negligence or willful conduct 
or if his conduct would be justified under the rules of German 
law, for example on the grounds of self-defence, no action could 
be maintained."125 Hence, in regard to defendants who are Ger~ 
man citizens, German law applies something like the actionability 
provision of Phillips v. Eyre! Although neither the English nor 
American damages rules are desirable, this German provision is 
defective, perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree, since, although 
it recognizes some contact of the parties with the forum, it does 
so at the expense of all contacts other than that of the defendant's 
nationality. 
It is worth noting, in concluding this discussion as to damages, 
an encouraging English decision recently rendered by Pilcher, 
J., in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court.126 The 
question was admittedly one involving a contract but the reason-
ing employed may be applicable to issues of tort. In breach of 
his contract, of which Portuguese law was the proper law, the 
English defendant failed to open a credit account in escudos at 
Lisbon in favor of the Portuguese plaintiff, his supplier, as a 
result of which the plaintiff in turn was unable to open a Lisbon 
credit account in favor of his own supplier to whom he was there-
fore obliged to pay damages. These he sought to recover from 
the defendant who pleaded that they were too remote and that 
questions of remoteness were procedural and therefore determin-
able by the lex fori. Pilcher, J., followed the suggestion of 
Cheshire which was fortified by a decision of the Supreme Court 
124 This is of course the very opposite of the conclusion which would be reached 
in an American court. See, e.g., Reilly v. Antonio Pepe Co., 108 Conn. 436, 143 A. 568 
(1928). 
125 Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," 47 L.Q. REv. 483 at 499-500 
(1931). 
126 J. D'Almaeida Araujo Ltd. v. Becker & Co., [1953] 2 Q.B. 329. 
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of Canada127 that questions of remoteness and measure of damages 
are separable, the former being governable by the proper law 
of the contract, and only the latter by the lex fori. Cheshire's 
reasoning is directed to questions of tort as well as contract and 
upholds the principles stated in the Ekin's case in 1717: 
"There can be no doubt, at least on principle, that remote-
. ness of liability must be governed by the proper law of the 
obligation that rests upon the defendant. Not only the ex-
istence, but also the extent, of an obligation, whether it 
springs from a breach of contract or the commission of a 
wrong, must be determined by the system of law from which 
it derives its source."128 · 
Unfortunately, though this inay represent a welcome departure 
in tort cases from applying the lex fori automatically, Cheshire 
sees "the proper law of the obligation" as being different in 
principle in contract and in tort. In the former, he rightly stresses 
the law of the place with the most intimate connection; in the 
latter, he treats the proper law of the obligation in all cases as the 
lex loci delicti commissi, and thus goes to the same extreme as 
the American courts. 
In disapproving of Cheshire's reasoning and supporting the 
conventional English rules relating to torts in the conflict of 
laws, Thomas cites the traditional defense of the English rules 
in a most unfortunate manner: 
" ... if it appear that the defendant has a defence under the 
lex loci delicti (and a fortiori if the matter be not cognisable 
by the courts of the locus delicti), that determines that the 
court had no jurisdiction in fact. The explanation permits 
the recognition of the action as wholly English-which is, in 
fact, the position; and thus also justifies the determination of 
remoteness of damage as well as the measure of damages by 
English law-for English law is the proper law of the tort."129 
To say that English courts treat actions on foreign torts as Eng-
lish actions is one thing; to state that they all give rise to wholly 
English actions and that English law is therefore the proper law 
is a most unfortunate choice of terms. 
127 Livesly v. Horst, [1924] S.C.R. 605. 
128 CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 4th ed., 660 (1952). 
129 Note, 3 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 651 at 659 (1954). 
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X. THE EFFECT OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE p ARTIES 
A further question which has received substantial attention 
in recent American decisions is as to the effect on actionability 
of the fact that the parties are related.130 Where they are husband 
and wife, the usual American view appears to require the applica-
tion of the law of the place of impact since the matter is treated 
as one of substance. This view has now been applied, as in Gray 
v. Gray,131 even where the forum is the domicile of the parties 
and its law differs markedly from that of the lex loci delicti 
commissi. In maintaining that the latter law governs, American 
courts have not conceded that this should be the whole law of 
the place of impact and consequently uniformly apply only its 
internal law. There is, unfortunately, no American case in which 
a court has applied the renvoi doctrine to husband and wife 
situations in tort, although clearly it might sometimes play a 
useful role in avoiding unfortunate conclusions or rules of law. 
If in Gray v. Gray, and more recently in Hansen v. Hansen,182 
the forum had applied the classification which an English court 
would have applied in such a case, a remedy would have been 
available. On the other hand, to classify it as procedural in all 
cases may have an unfortunate result if the internal law of the 
forum would not grant a remedy. This suggests that deciding the 
issue, in effect, solely by the method of classification is dependent 
solely on the forum's past attitude toward such problems and 
may ignore the strength of the policy of other jurisdictions and 
the closeness of the parties' contacts with those jurisdictions. 
It seems fairly widely agreed, in principle at least, that inter-
spousal disability in tort cases is an unfortunate anomaly whose 
justification rests on primarily historical grounds. The common 
law unity of husband and wife is substantially a fiction and has 
been recognized as such in many other branches of law. Thus, 
as was said recently, "the wife may sue her husband for dis-
honesty, for unlawful taking of her property, for debts he re-
fuses to pay, or for any other such matters, even though such 
130 See McCurdy, "Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation," 43 HAR.v. L. REv. 
1030 (1930). 
131 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934). 
132 274 Wis. 262, 80 N.W. (2d) 230 (1956). 
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actions would produce 'public scandal of the family discord' as 
effectually as would the bringing of a tort action .... [A]ctions 
in tort can hardly be said to be any more immoral or violative 
of justice than are actions for fraud or breach of property 
rights."133 Yet, with still worse effects, the unity doctrine is car-
ried still further in the United States,184 and probably would be 
in England as well,135 by denying a remedy to a person who, 
after the date that the alleged cause of action arose, married the 
wrongdoer. 
Although the courts have not as yet sufficiently adopted an 
interests-weighing approach to questions of interspousal or in-
terfamily disabilities or as to whether a wife can sue in her own 
name, there are some recent cases which are more encouraging. 
In Emery v. Emery, involving a parent-child action, the court 
stated: 
"We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit 
because of a family relationship are more properly deter-
mined by reference to the law of the state of the family 
domicile. That state has the · primary responsibility for es-
tablishing and regulating the incidents of the family relation-
ship .... Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, duties, 
disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by the 
family relationship should constantly change as members 
of the family cross state boundaries during temporary ab-
sences from their home."186 
If a husband and wife problem occurs in the context of vicar-
ious responsibility, as where the husband injures the wife during 
the course of his employment, most American courts would 
probably apply the law of the place of impact, although some 
continue to follow the theory that interspousal disabilities are 
matters of procedure governed by the lex fori. Hence, in Baker 
v. Gaffney,181 although the accident occurred in New York, the 
133 Franklin v. Wills, (6th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 899 at 900. 
134 Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931); Coster v. Coster, 289 
N.Y. 438, 46 N.E. (2d) 509 (1943). 
135 Gottliffe v. Edelston, [1930] 2 K.B. 378. 
186 45 Cal. (2d) 421 at 428, 289 P. (2d) 218 (1955). Also see Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 
Cal. (2d) 859, 264 P. (2d) 944 (1953), although it does not deal with the husband-wife 
relation. 
137 (D.C. D.C. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 602. In Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. 505, 
12 S. (2d) 253 (1942), the wife of a Texas domiciliary was injured by her husband in 
1126 : MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
District of Columbia court applied its own common law, which 
it had borrowed· from Maryland, holding the defendant not 
liable since the plaintiff could not sue her husband· who had 
been lent the car by the defendant. By the . New York law the 
wife could sue her husband. It should be noted· that under 
New York law, even if the accident had occurred before the 
husband-wife disability had been removed by statute because of 
the decision in Mertz· v. Mertz,138 it has been recognized at least 
since 1928139 that the employer cannot take shelter: behind a 
disability which is that of one of the spouses. This would be 
"to pervert the meaning and effect of the disability that had its 
origin in marital identity." Because of the recent English de-
cision in Broom v. Morgan,140 it seems that a similar result would 
today be reached in the English courts, even though they would 
classify the interspousal disability as a matter of procedure and 
therefore generally deny an action between spouses. If, how-
ever, an English action involved a foreign tort relating to the 
wife's separate property, as defined by English law, then there 
would be no disability even by English internal law. What 
constitutes separate property may sometimes be difficult to de-
cide, as in Ralston v. Ralston, in which, disallowing a female 
garage-owner's action for libel committed by her husband, the 
court stated ". . . It cannot be said that chastity is a necessary 
qualification for the management or ownership of a garage."141 
Where the interspousal relationship is relevant, not because 
one· spouse proceeds against the other, but because the tort of 
one spouse results in action against the other by a third party, 
the problem then is not one of procedural incapacities but 
rather goes to different considerations. In such cases the law of the 
matrimonial domicile may be more relevant than that of the place 
Louisiana in the course of his employment. In Texas, ,because of community of property, 
the cause of action would have been community property and the husband alone could 
have sued. This would have resulted in the husband suing the employer for his own 
negligence. In an action in Louisiana it was held that the law of the place of impact and 
form applied and the wife was allowed to sue. In the earlier case of Williams v. Pope 
Mfg. Co., 52 La. 1417, 27 S. 851 (1900), which is often cited, the same court applied the 
law of the wife's domicile so as to allow her to sue, since at that time the law of 
Louisiana, which was also the place of impact and forum, denied her such a right. 
138,Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. (2d) 597 (1936). 
139 Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928). 
140 [1953] 1 All E.R. 849. 
141 [1930] 2 K.B. 238 at 245. 
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of impact. In Siegmann v. Meyer142 the wife assaulted the plain-
tiff in Florida while there without her husband, who was joined 
as defendant in the instant action in New York. Both the hus-
band and wife were throughout citizens of New York and the 
husband had never been in Florida. New York law does not 
make a husband liable for the torts of his wife whereas Florida 
preserves the old common law rule. The district court dismissed 
the complaint as to the husband and Judge Learned Hand for 
the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal reserving the question 
"as to what should be the result, if the husband had been in 
Florida when the tort was committed, and whether his subjec-
tion to judgment ought to read as a liability, or as a mere pro-
cedural requirement."143 
As to this decision and the dictum of Judge Hand at least two 
points are worth noting. First, on the facts of this case it may 
cogently be argued that even though the Florida provision was 
substantive, New York courts might question the basis of legisla-
tive jurisdiction for the imposition of such vicarious liability. 
The Supreme Court has sanctioned as to automobiles a departure 
from the established principles of jurisdiction laid down in 
Pennoyer v. Nefj144 holding in Olberding v. Illinois Central R. 
Co.145 that the theory of implied consent for vicarious liability 
is not the proper basis for decision. Justice Frankfurter has stated: 
"In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these cases does 
not rest on consent at all. . . . The liability rests on the in-
road which the automobile has made on the decision of 
Pennoyer v. Neff . ... The potentialities of damage by a 
motorist, in a population as mobile as ours, are such that 
those whom he injures must have opportunities of redress 
against him provided only that he is afforded an opportunity 
to defend himself. "146 
But to conclude that the reasoning applied to wandering wagons 
should apply to wandering wives is unjustified. Similar considera-
tions would appear to apply to parental liability for the torts of 
minor children. But a case closer to the automobile situation 
142 (2d Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 367. 
143 Id. at 368. 
144 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
145 346 U.S. 338 (1953). 
146 Id. at 341. 
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is suggested by the case of a dog who wanders across a state-line 
where he feels entitled to his first bite. 147 
The second question raised by Judge Hand's opinion in 
·siegmann v. Meyer is that specifically left unanswered by the 
court, namely, whether New York could deny effect to the 
Florida law making the husband liable for the tort of his wife 
if at the time of the tort he too was in Florida. Particularly in 
the light of the recent decision of Hughes v. Fetter this latter 
question would become most acute if by statute Florida provided 
for such liability, since if the husband were present there would 
be little doubt as to Florida possessing legislative jurisdiction. 
Were there such a statute, and were the husband present in 
Florida at the time of the tort and were the case to now be pre-
sented for decision it would be a question whether the public 
policy of New York, the domicile of the parties, was sufficiently 
strong to bring the case within the exception provided for even 
in the majority opinion in Hughes v. Fetter. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
The main defect of these decisions, whether they are con-
cerned with damages or with interspousal disabilities or, for 
example, with the liability of joint tortfeasors or partnerships 
or employers, is .that they employ fixed and inflexible rules to 
determine issues which, because of their variety and complexity, 
may demand the careful weighing and balancing of competing 
interests. In the United States, in cases in which the- courts are 
not concerned with the "tortiousness" of the conduct as such 
but rather with its incidents, the tendency has been strongly 
against applying the law of the forum. In a federal system, in 
which conflict of laws cases are more likely to touch the interests 
of a number of states of the Union than those of member states 
and foreign countries, it is understandable and commendable 
that the need for mutual recognition has been acknowledged. 
However, the law of the place of impact has been treated as 
the panacea for all conflict of laws problems involving torts, 
subject only to preserving certain administrative conveniences 
147 Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109 (1875). 
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at the forum. In England, on the other hand, the same basic 
attitude is adopted toward the incidents of conduct as to the 
question of its tortiousness, and the lex fori is applied to deter-
mine virtually all questions which may arise. The approach of 
both countries is unfortunate-that of the United States because, 
although it recognizes the existence of some foreign interests, 
makes little effort to investigate which of these should be deter-
minative or whether its own would be more appropriate; that 
of England, because it tends to ignore the existence of any 
interests other than its own. From the few examples which have 
been given it should be obvious that no single formula can fairly 
answer the multitude of questions which may arise in even 
simple situations of torts which touch the interests of more than 
one jurisdiction. Problems of torts and conflict of laws when 
arising in combination are too pregnant with competing interests 
to justify the application of a few rigid rules which are likely 
in many instances to overlook important and relevant considera-
tions. Although the need for certainty and predictability of re-
sult is undoubtedly an important factor in the law-making 
process, the exclusion of flexibility should not be the required 
condition. The argument for a proper law of tort, which could 
meet both English and American policy requirements however 
diverse, is not a new one-it has been admirably put by Morris,148 
and it is hoped that the present paper offers some further support 
for the adoption of such an approach and that it indicates some 
of the relevant considerations in determining what law or laws 
should govern tort situations in the conflict of laws. It is en-
couraging to note that the provision dealing with foreign torts 
in the recently promulgated Benelux Convention adopts a view 
by no means unsympathetic to that here advocated. Article 18 
of the Convention provides that the law of a country where an 
act takes place determines whether that act is illegal as well as 
the obligations which result therefrom. If the consequences of 
the illegal act belong to the juridical sphere of a country149 other 
148 Morris, "The Proper Law of a Tort," 64 HARV. L. R.Ev. 881 (1951). 
149 "Appartiennent a la sphere juridique" as used in other places in the convention 
as well as here strongly indicates that what is intended is -that the proper law is deter• 
minative, or perhaps, more properly, that the law which by comity is the proper law 
is to be determinative. However, it is widely admitted that "sphere juridique" was 
intentionally used so as to verbalize out of the difficulty of carefully stating what was 
specifically intended. 
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than that where the act took place, the resulting obligations are 
determined by the law of that other country.150 
150 Perhaps because of the relatively new idea advanced by the second paragraph 
of this article, the translations from the official French have generally been defective. 
Translations appear in 3 UNIFICATION OF LAW-A GENERAL SURVEY OF WORK FOR THE 
UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 1947-1952 (1954), and in "Uniform Law on the Conflict 
of Laws," l INT. & COMP. L.Q. 426 at 430 (1952). As Nadelmann has pointed out, both 
speak of effects of an unlawful act which " 'are produced within' the legal system of some 
country other than the country where the act has taken place," whereas "[t]he original 
text does not speak of effects which 'are produced within' but of effects which 'pertain 
to' the legal system of another country-which is a different thing." Nadelmann, "Unifica-
tion of 'Private Law," 29 TULANE L. REV. 328 at 330, n. 8 (1955). The official French 
provides: "La loi du pays ou un fait a lieu determine si ce fait constitue un acte illicite, 
ainsi que les obligations que en resultent. Toutefois, si les consequences de l'acte illicitc 
appartiennent a la sphere jurisdique d'un pays autre que celui ou le fait a eu lieu, les 
obligations qui en resultent sont determinees par la loi de cet autre pays." See "Loi 
Uniforme Relative Au Droit International Prive," 40 REv. CRITIQUE DE DROIT INT. PRIVE 
710 at 713 (1951). 
